


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№ 6(11)  
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## Strategic partnership Russia – European Union: principles and prospects



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*Edited by Alexander Nikitin, Andrey Kazantsev*

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## Стратегическое партнерство России и Евросоюза: принципы и перспективы

*Под редакцией  
Александра Никитина и Андрея Казанцева*

Москва  
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2006

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**Moscow State Institute of International Relations (University)  
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## **Strategic Partnership Russia – European Union: Principles and Prospects**

*Ed. by Alexander Nikitin,  
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# Prospects and Principles of Strategic Partnership EU – Russia

*By Carl Hallergard*

## Introduction

The enlargement of the European Union brought the European Union and Russia closer together, and further strengthened the rationale for a close and effective strategic partnership, based on shared values and common interests.

This fundamental policy was confirmed by EU ministers in February 2005 after an internal EU assessment of its relations with Russia. They confirmed the EU's determination to build a genuine strategic partnership with Russia based on equal rights and obligations, mutual trust and an open and frank dialogue”.

Following the recent agreement between the EU and Russia on the extension of the Partnership and Co-operation Agreement to the ten new EU Member States, and the adoption of a Joint Statement on EU enlargement and EU/Russia relations addressing the concerns Russia had expressed with regard to EU enlargement, there is now an important opportunity to increase co-operation and strengthen the EU-Russia strategic partnership.

Use of this opportunity, however, requires a proper understanding of the basic objectives and expectations of each side for the EU-Russia relationship.

This paper will try to outline and explain the main objectives and expectations from an EU perspective. It does not pretend to present official EU policy, only to put EU views in a slightly broader context.

## Shared values and common interests

It is not difficult to identify the common interests between the EU and Russia that justify close co-operation. The main categories are identified below. However, for the European Union, a genuine and durable strategic partnership with Russia can only be based on shared values. Which these values are and how they underpin the common interests is explained thereafter.

## Common interests

The common interests are first of all economic: trade with the enlarged EU represents more than 50% of Russia's external trade. Russia is a major supplier of energy to the European Union. Russian accession to the World Trade Organization is a shared objective. There will always be trade disputes, perhaps even increasingly so now when mutual interdependence and the

volume of exchange have grown even further with EU enlargement, and issues of economic governance will remain on the agenda for the foreseeable future. However, such disputes should not be mistaken for fundamental differences of view on the value of greater economic co-operation and exchange, including in such fields as transport, energy, services, agriculture, telecommunications, etc.

The EU and Russia also have a common interest in protecting the environment. As close neighbors, the EU and Russia increasingly share the same environment and therefore share responsibility for ensuring that it is protected. The Baltic Sea is a clear case in point. Moreover, as major global actors, the EU and Russia also share responsibility for global challenges to the environment, such as climate change and the entry into force of the Kyoto protocol.

The EU and Russia both stand much to gain from closer co-operation in the field of justice and home affairs. Phenomena such as terrorism, illegal migration, trafficking of drugs and human beings, and other forms of organized crime and corruption are increasingly of a cross-border nature and therefore need to be combated in cooperation between the EU and Russia when they concern both sides. At the same time, the EU and Russia share an interest in promoting travel and exchange, and therefore in working together to facilitate them.

On the international scene, the EU and Russia share a strong interest in a rules-based international order founded on effective multilateralism. There are particular possibilities for co-operation to promote democracy and resolve frozen conflicts in countries which now constitute the common neighborhood: Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova and South Caucasus. The new geographic reality of the enlarged European Union opens up new possibilities for closer co-operation with Russia in these countries to promote development towards greater stability, the entrenchment of democracy and the resolution of remaining frozen conflicts and disputes. The EU and Russia also share a strong interest in co-operating to address new threats such as the proliferation of weapons of mass-destruction and international terrorism. The EU and Russia should also develop their co-operation in the field of crisis management and civil protection.

Finally, in order to develop their future competitiveness, enhance their mutual understanding and promote dialogue and exchanges, the EU and Russia share an interest in promoting co-operation in the fields of research, education and culture.

These areas merely represent a short overview of areas where the EU and Russia have a clear interest in promoting their co-operation. To promote co-operation in these areas, the EU and Russia in St. Petersburg in May 2003 agreed to develop four common spaces (Common Economic Space; Common space on Freedom, Security and Justice; Common space on External Security and Common Space on Research and Education, including Culture) and to launch the Permanent Partnership Council, which will allow the partners to meet directly and develop their co-operation. Both these instruments will allow for more direct and hopefully more productive contacts between the different ministries in Russia and the responsible services of the European Union in Brussels.

## Shared values

The European Union itself is based on the following fundamental principles:

- democracy,
- the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including a free and independent media,
- the rule of law, including the independent and transparent application of the rule of law by effective judicial systems.

These principles are inscribed in a number of Conventions, notably in the Framework of the Council of Europe and the OSCE, to which EU Member States as well as Russia are parties and have committed themselves politically. They are also central to the United Nations and form the basis for a number of human rights mechanisms. Respecting these values implies a readiness to accept scrutiny by the different mechanisms established by the UN, the Council of Europe and the OSCE. Examples of such mechanisms are the OSCE electoral observation missions, the Council of Europe Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Degrading Treatment, and the UN human rights rapporteurs.

For the strategic partnership between the EU and Russia, it is of fundamental importance that both parties fully subscribe to these values and accept their implications. It also implies that both sides must be ready to discuss internal matters related to the compliance with these commitments, and be ready to submit themselves to independent outside scrutiny even in sensitive matters. Failure to do so will not only undermine **trust**, but also dramatically weaken the support for the strategic partnership in EU institutions and European public opinion. It would lead to calls for limitations in further co-operation, criticism and public condemnation.

An illustration of the importance of these fundamental values to the European Union is the inclusion in all agreements with third countries of a human rights clause, the breach of which can lead to the suspension of the entire agreement and thereby the contractual relationship as a whole.

Any perception in the European Union that Russia does not live up to its international commitments will therefore not only weaken support for the partnership, it will also lead to calls for steps to limit the co-operation or make certain areas of co-operation conditional on compliance with these international obligations.

While the respect for these values therefore has a **direct** impact on the relationship as a whole, and is essential to ensure public support, it also has **indirect** effects on the ability of the EU and Russia to fully benefit from the common interests identified above:

- Economic exchange, whether trade or direct investment, will only grow in a sustainable way if traders and investors can rely on transparent and effective regulatory frameworks and turn to independent judicial systems. Doubts about the rules of the game, about possible political interference, and about the independence of the judicial system will have a devastating effect on the confidence of economic operators, and divert investors.

- Co-operation between police and judiciary authorities in the EU and Russia will only take place on the basis of mutual trust and confidence that adequate safeguard exists, that personal and sensitive information shared is not abused, and that the respective judicial systems respect basic principles of law. The sharing of sensitive intelligence in the fight against international terrorism is but one of the activities that requires the establishment of a high degree of confidence and trust between the services concerned.
- Effective co-operation on the international scene to promote democracy and the respect for human rights requires that both sides are seen as legitimate bearers of these fundamental values. Trust in the good intentions and standards of international military and police officers and officials is based on strict adherence to fundamental values at home.

A genuine and sustainable strategic partnership between the European Union and Russia therefore needs to be based both on shared values and common interests.

### **Specific opportunities for co-operation on the international scene**

There are many areas where the EU and Russia could (and do) co-operate on the international scene. Some of such opportunities are listed below:

- co-operation on the EU's and Russia's foreign policy and security doctrines and concepts;
- support for the reform of the United Nations, in particular the work of the UN Panel on Challenges and Change;
- co-operation between research institutes in Russia and the European Union in the field of international relations;
- conflict resolution in the common neighborhood of Russia and the enlarging European Union, e.g. in Moldova (Transnistria);
- promotion of democracy and reform in the common neighborhood of Russia and the enlarged European Union, e.g. in Belarus;
- co-operation in the framework of the United Nations to strengthen the fight against terrorism, including terrorism financiers;
- co-operation to strengthen international disarmament as well as arms control and non-proliferation regimes;
- strengthened co-operation in the field of disaster relief.

# Strategic Partnership Russia – EU: Conceptual Basis and Cooperation in the Sphere of International Security

*By Dmitry Danilov*

From the moment of ratification of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between Russia and Europe (in 1997) a complex institutionalized system of cooperation between Russia and the EU has been developed. Cooperation progresses in all directions including the sphere of international relations and international security.

However, a long-term perspective of Russian-European relations is still uncertain. The strategies in this sphere adopted by both partners in 1999 do not meet the necessary requirements. The EU strategy was heavily criticized by J. Solana for mostly accumulating different policies towards Russia conducted by different member states and for being not the EU own long-term strategy. The Russian middle-term strategy was adopted in the transitional period between two presidential administrations and between different foreign policy paradigms. So it is also a highly controversial document.

Consequently, the EU and Russia have been confronted with the problem of choosing a future role model and constructing principles of their long-term relations. This choice can be reduced to two options. The first one is saving the previous form and content of cooperation that can be characterized as selective pragmatic partnership in the spheres of mutual interest. The second one is finding the paradigm of real strategic partnership oriented towards jointly formulated long-term aims in the realm of developing relations.

For the second option the following preconditions should be met: (a) clear and consistent political will of both actors; (b) working out a common strategy on this basis; (c) transition within the framework of this partnership strategy towards common institutionalized mechanisms of decision making. It is clear that none of the preconditions has been met yet.

On the other hand, both sides have manifested political will to overcome restricted character of their relations and to render it a new quality.

It is well understood now that the absence of long term perspectives limits the partnership – even in its present-day form of pragmatic and selective cooperation. One of the reasons behind this is a growing Russian dissatisfaction with the character of its European relations. The other reason is a gap between political declarations about the “strategic partnership” and the absence of visible progress in their realization. The third reason is growing politicizing of concrete issues in current agenda of bilateral relations. This provokes growing disagreements – up to a virtual crisis – as it was in 2002 in the context of Kaliningrad problem. So the model of cooperation has stopped to correspond to strategic interests of both sides even taking into

account objective differences of these interests.

Dynamics of Russian and European development made political choice of future model of their relations more urgent. Deep EU transformation accompanied by its expansion brought to the forefront the problem of searching for the strategy of dealing with the external world in general and, in particular, with the EU's eastern neighbors. That is why Russia remains an important partner for the EU, and in some areas this partnership is a strategic one or even does not have any alternative (energy supply). Elaborating long-term strategy towards Russia is one of the key points of future European foreign strategy as a whole.

Stabilization of the situation in Russia during Vladimir Putin's presidential term and his course towards Russia's modernization also made the problem of rethinking European relations vital. From this point of view simply accepting the EU as a natural priority partner for Russia should be transferred to effective strategic partnership. The absence of progress in this respect has already strengthened the positions of those representatives of the Russian elite who urged to reconsider the status of the EU as a long-term partner.

In this situation both actors have made real steps in the direction of finding long-term strategy of their relations. During Saint-Petersburg summit (May, 2003) Russia and the EU have agreed to create common space in some key areas: economy, internal freedoms, justice, external security, education and culture. This is quite logical because irrespective of the coexistence of "two Europes" they both, in fact, constitute a single space from the point of view of common problems and challenges.

Nevertheless, both sides differently understand the content of these "common spaces". European policy is based on spreading its values, political principles, legal norms and even informal practices into new integration spaces. This logic is well justified in relation to the EU's enlargement, but it is automatically transferred into the sphere of European-Russian relations although Russia is not considered even as a potential EU candidate country.

The EU does not demonstrate its readiness to make compromises in relations to Russia. It tries to achieve higher level of relations with Russia demanding different concessions (talks about Russia's WTO entry are a classical example of this).

Russia, for its part, understands the "desire of the EU to create a friendly environment around its borders", but it does not share the aspiration of single Europe to make this environment "to orient towards internal EU standards"<sup>1</sup>. Thus even on the initial stage – a stage of drawing a kind of "road maps" for the future trip towards common spaces – the EU and Russia are confronted with a serious problem, namely, the absence of a common vision of these spaces. Evidently, this contradiction will affect those areas of cooperation where the asymmetry of actors' potentials is most significant (most of all, in the economic sphere). From this point of view,

<sup>1</sup> A statement by V.A. Chizhov, a deputy foreign minister of the Russian Federation, on the Conference in Berlin, 23 June, 2004.

the perspectives of forming a single space in the sphere of external security seem to be relatively more favorable. Besides there are some positive recent shifts in the attitude of the EU towards Russian approach<sup>2</sup>.

In general, Russian-European relations in the sphere of the European security and defense policy (ESDP) develop positively. However, irrespective of close positions on some sensitive international security issues (Afghanistan, Iraq, the Middle East, etc.) these relations can not be characterized as developing into a strategic partnership. At the same time, both sides have recently manifested a political will to start moving in this direction. Now the central problem is a degree, in which this political will correspond to real strategic choice and in which it would be practically realized.

On the one hand, the EU and Russia have clearly declared their intention to create a common space in the sphere of international security. On the other hand, a strategic choice of the partners is still unclear. In the European Security Strategy cooperation with Russia was only mentioned in the context of listing other partners (Japan, China, Canada, India). This contradicts to Saint Petersburg agreements. The disagreements about the ways of resolving Moldova conflict and the absence of consultations on this issue are the evidence of unilateralist drive of both sides, and that is in a clear contradiction with the course towards strategic partnership.

In order to overcome declarative character of the Russian-European relations in the sphere of international security one should first of all clearly define what each side understands under the term “strategic partnership”. It seems that the defining features of strategic partnership are:

- Common definition by the partners of strategic aims and main tasks in the sphere of international security. This task includes comparing prior long-term interests of each side, their conceptual approaches and doctrines in the sphere of security. A common political platform or a security strategy can be developed on this basis.
- Developing and adopting common political directives (political obligations of the partners) aimed at realizing planned aims and tasks.
- Practical programs and plans of actions in the areas of mutual interest can be developed within the framework of common political positions.
- It is necessary to functionally expand existing system of political dialogue and consultations for guaranteeing such a model of cooperation as a necessary element of strategic partnership. On the basis of this system a set of institutionalized mechanisms for elaborating, adopting and realizing decisions should be developed.

After an answer to the question “What is to be built” now it is necessary to define “How is it to be built”, or the Conception of Partnership. In this respect, **the basic principles of cooperation** should be defined, first of all. There

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<sup>2</sup> This is testified by the Document of the European Commission on the relations with Russia (COM(2004) 106, 09/02/04).

the problem is not in mapping universal principles of the Russian-European strategic partnership but in guaranteeing their realization. This presumes the necessity to create a normative base and institutional mechanisms of cooperation in accordance with the principles of strategic partnership.

Equality of the sides is a key principle of a strategic partnership. Russia and the EU have declared their adherence to equal cooperation. However, it is very interesting that the EU is *not questioning* this principle while Russia is emphatically *defending it*.

The EU reasonably insists upon placing common values and standards at the basis of strategic partnership. However, the EU believes that its own norms and standards are the universal criteria in this respect. (“*It is in the EU’s interest to seek an open, stable and democratic Russia, acting as a strategic partner which can uphold European values...*”<sup>3</sup>.) That is why partnership “on the basis of common values” according to European scenario does not mean equal partnership. For Russia equal partnership is not only a right of equal voice in the relations with the EU, but it is also a mutually beneficial cooperation.

Cooperation in the sphere of peace support remains one of important topics in Russian-European relations. The EU prefers Russia to participate in the operations conducted by the European Union under its control. However, strategic partnership means broader approach to the issue when different forms of common peace support efforts are possible.

However, Russia aspiring to achieve equal cooperation at the same time avoids discussing with the EU the possibility of common peace support on the CIS territory. And the EU gave some grounds for this. The EU’s attempt to intervene into Moldova conflict settlement was, in fact, an alternative to the Russian efforts and Russian role in this conflict’s resolution.

The EU would like Russia as its partner to “*continue reforms, implement commitments and, in cooperation with the EU, play a constructive role in the NIS*”<sup>4</sup>. This statement can be read as, first, dissatisfaction of the EU with the (non-constructive?) role of Russia in the New Independent States and, second, confidence that this role can be constructive only in cooperating with the EU. These tendencies increase Russian fears that activation of the European role on the Post-Soviet space would mean not a progress in the direction of strategic partnership (a “win-win” scenario), but, vice versa, minimization of the Russian role in the CIS (a “zero-sum game”).

Russia does not put under doubt that the strategic partnership should be based on common values. In this respect, Russia agrees with the definition of the European Security Strategy on the partnership with Russia: “*Respect for common values will reinforce progress towards a strategic partnership*”<sup>5</sup>. At the same time, the EU should restraint from instrumental use of criteria of “common values” when they are used simply as a pretext for moderating cooperation with Russia. Recently some positive shifts appeared in the

<sup>3</sup> COM(2004) 106, P.3.

<sup>4</sup> COM(2004) 106, P.3.

<sup>5</sup> A secure Europe in a better world, European Council, Thessaloniki 20/06/2003. P. 14.

positions of both sides in this respect.

It is very important that the EU has declared the necessity to constructively engage itself in developing cooperation with Russia (“*A pro-active approach, in which the EU defines precise, realistic objectives on the basis of reciprocity, will send a strong signal of the EU engagement to Russia*”<sup>6</sup>). This approach presumes refusing from “batching” cooperation depending on evaluating the partner according to the scale of “European values”. This also presupposes accepting the line of constructive dialogue in this sphere (“This implies discussing frankly Russian practices that run counter to universal and European values, such as democracy, human rights in Chechnya, media freedom and some environmental issues”, COM(2004) 106, P. 6). This constructive dialogue better corresponds to the principles of equality and reciprocity of relations translating them into the sphere of mutually shared values and common interests (“Genuine strategic partnership must be founded on shared values and common interests”<sup>7</sup>).

In case of developing cooperation Russia gets (due to its reciprocal character) relatively more possibilities and arguments for on EU influence (for example, on the issues of Russian minority rights, human rights in the conflict zones (the Balkans), struggle with international terrorism, principles of using force). It seems that traditional fears of such Russian influence are still strong in the EU and this holds back real partnership. That is why the progress on the way towards strategic partnership depends on the degree to which Russian partners would overcome these fears (“*Russia is an important partner, with which there is considerable interest to engage and build a genuine strategic partnership on the basis of positive interdependence*”<sup>8</sup>).

Russia and the EU are consistent proponents of **multilateralism in the sphere of international security** which is one of the principles and, simultaneously, one of the driving forces behind their cooperation.

Political will to form real partnership relations should be consistently realized in political practice. Until now the EU, irrespective of Russian demands, has not shown enough interest in the development of equal practical cooperation. But recent agreements between the parties and EU decisions lead to constructive change of European approach. (*EU needs to “engage with Russia to build a genuine strategic partnership, moving away from grand political declarations and establishing an issues-based strategy and agenda”*<sup>9</sup>).

However, in general the Russian and European approaches towards the sphere of institutional guaranties of partnership are different. For the EU developing practical partnership is a priority in comparison with institutionalizing relations with Russia. The Russian Federation, although it strives for filling partnership with real contents, is putting emphasis on strengthening cooperation institutions (“*Russia often seeks to treat questions by setting up new negotiating mechanisms. The EU should [...] continue to give*

<sup>6</sup> COM(2004) 106, P. 6-7.

<sup>7</sup> COM(2004) 106, P. 6.

<sup>8</sup> COM(2004) 106, P. 6.

<sup>9</sup> COM(2004) 106, P. 6.

<sup>10</sup> COM(2004) 106, P. 4.

*priority to substance over form, with a view to obtaining concrete results*"<sup>10</sup>). At the same time, transferring the Russian-European relations into a new qualitative level, including the aspect of their effectiveness, demands an adequate institutional foundations.

Equality and mutually beneficial cooperation presume common responsibility and division of labor between the partners. Russia, as well as the EU, is trying to move in this direction. This does not mean division of spheres of influence, but rather "shared", i.e. common (and not separate) responsibility of strategic partners. This common responsibility should be based upon mutual consultations as well as upon working out common political position. Thus, both sides would adhere to a common political platform. However, the regional leadership should be the responsibility of one of the sides, taking into account its specific regional interests, roles and influences. The most obvious examples of that is the Post-Soviet space (Moldova, Caucasus, Central Asia), where the leading role should be given to Russia, or the Balkans, where the EU should bear the main responsibility. This approach could increase the interest of the actors in cooperating and compel them to avoid "prohibited zones" for developing partnership.

The European-Russian partnership within the framework of the division of responsibility in the area of the EU's "new neighborhood", where the EU is trying to strengthen its role and influence, would be a good alternative to spontaneous struggle. Russia treats with suspicion European Union's declarations regarding mutually beneficial cooperation on the CIS territory.

## Conclusions

Russia and the EU have demonstrated a political will to transfer their bilateral relations into real strategic partnership. Cooperation in the sphere of international relations and security should become one of the directions of this partnership. For realizing this intention it is necessary, first of all, to define the **content of strategic partnership** and the elements that characterize it.

It seems that the key elements of the strategic partnership are:

- common strategic aims and tasks in the sphere of international security (common security strategy and political platform);
- common political directives (political obligations of the partners) aimed at realizing planned aims and tasks;
- practical programs and plans of actions in the areas of mutual interest;
- a set of institutionalized mechanisms for elaborating, adopting and realizing decisions.

For forming strategic partnership relations it is necessary to define the Conception of partnership, which includes, first of all, basic principles of interaction that Russia and the EU should follow moving to the proclaimed aims of strategic partnership in the sphere of security. Russia and the EU could agree on the following principles that are interconnected and should

be realized as a single complex:

- Equality,
- Adherence to common values,
- Multilateralism on the basis of international law, norms and principles of the UN,
- Developing functional (oriented towards practical results) partnership,
- Guaranteeing continuity and consistency of cooperation,
- Responsibility of sides,
- Adequate institutional guarantees,
- Adherence to peaceful methods of resolving international conflicts,
- Strengthening preventive diplomacy and proactive actions,

# Partnership Strategique UE/Russie: Faisons un Rêve...

*Dominique David*

Le partenariat Russie-Union européenne est un des objets les plus encombrants, et les moins définis, du débat européen de la dernière décennie. Ni l'héritage d'une histoire souvent commune, ni la proximité culturelle, ou territoriale, ni les volontés proclamées, ou les multiples accords bilatéraux ou multilatéraux, n'ont suffi à en faire une réalité opérationnelle. Des traditions ou des visions du monde divergentes, des difficultés à gérer les échéances de court terme, ont eu raison de projets faussement évidents. L'apparition d'une nouvelle Russie, que confirme la réélection de Vladimir Poutine, le nouvel élargissement de l'Union, ainsi que les cahots du système international de l'après 11 septembre, invitent pourtant à questionner à nouveau cette idée d'un partenariat privilégié, *stratégique* : c'est-à-dire potentiellement déterminant pour le continent.

## Des modèles successifs et brouillés

Les quinze années qui nous séparent de l'explosion du système Est-Ouest ont épuisé plusieurs modèles pour une introuvable architecture européenne – même si ces modèles ont rarement été présentés comme tels-, dans une géographie politique particulièrement difficile à dessiner.

L'idée que le continent européen constitue une *maison commune* est, au seuil des années 90, l'héritage le plus visible de la diplomatie soviétique relue par Gorbatchev. Elle est aussi, de fait, la référence d'une diplomatie française qui souhaite que le continent s'émancipe du système atlantique. C'est le fond du concept de « confédération européenne » avancé à Paris dès 1989. Cette idée d'une communauté pan-européenne sous-tendra les tentatives, à l'ouest (Allemagne, France...), ou à l'est de l'Europe (Moscou...), d'installer la CSCE, puis l'OSCE au cœur d'un nouveau dispositif de sécurité. L'échec de l'OSCE, concept européen s'il en est en dépit de la présence des Etats-Unis qui y sont réduits au statut d'Etat « ordinaire », prouve bientôt que, contrairement à ce que pensent nombre de Français, l'architecture du continent européen ne peut pas être seulement européenne. Dans les années qui ont suivi l'explosion du système Est-Ouest, l'analyse de fait commune entre Paris et Moscou était que la fin de la bipolarité allait « européaniser » les problèmes de l'Europe. Ceux-ci devraient donc désormais être définis et traités par des institutions spécifiquement européennes – les Etats-Unis demeurant à la marge du système, dans un rôle d'assurance extérieure. Une analyse qui se heurte très vite à une réalité divergente.

L'échec d'un tel modèle euro-centré doit beaucoup à Washington, aux blocages institutionnels de l'OSCE, et aux réticences des pays centre-Européens à favoriser une machinerie sur laquelle les Etats-Unis ont peu de prise. Mais incertitudes et rêves de la diplomatie russe y ont

aussi leur part. L'axe *Moscou / Washington*, tel qu'on le voit alors à Moscou, relève beaucoup du fantasme, mais il traduit aussi des ambitions concrètes. Il permet à Moscou de jouer la dernière carte héritée de la superpuissance soviétique : celle du dialogue bilatéral. Il l'autorise aussi à parler assez haut pour un espace (post-soviétique) qu'elle ne contrôle plus. Il est enfin l'écho d'une capacité de nuisance russe redoutée à Washington – en particulier pour tout ce qui concerne les armes nucléaires.

Cet « axe » est aussi le reflet de l'impuissance ouest-européenne. Cette dernière s'exprime d'abord dans l'incapacité de la Politique Etrangère et de Sécurité Commune (PESC) née à Maastricht, à gérer le problème yougoslave ; puis, plus largement dans l'échec à organiser les relations de l'Union avec les Etats qui l'entourent sous une autre forme que l'alternative adhésion / non-adhésion. Les pays européens les plus réticents vis-à-vis d'une nouvelle légitimation de l'Alliance atlantique en Europe vont d'ailleurs s'en rapprocher (la France, dès 1992, puis très officiellement en 1994, plus encore après 1995), l'Union naissante ne pouvant apparaître comme un acteur politico-stratégique complet. Cette Union n'a donc pas de place dans l'héritage de la super-puissance soviétique qui obsède encore Moscou, et elle ne s'impose pas non plus rapidement dans le nouveau paysage.

Paradoxalement, dans les années 90, la position de Moscou vis-à-vis de Bruxelles ressemble assez à la vision des pays-candidats d'Europe centrale : elle privilégie l'image d'efficacité économique de l'Union, en considérant avec défiance ses ambitions politiques. Dans la deuxième partie de la décennie, la proclamation du partenariat russo-européen, la *stratégie commune* élaborée par Bruxelles, seront largement vidées de leur sens par la pusillanimité de l'Union, le chaos d'un eltsinisme déclinant, et les allers et retours de la position russe vis-à-vis de l'Alliance. Resituée par la volonté de la plupart des Européens ainsi que par leur impuissance au centre de la gestion des crises du continent, l'Alliance s'élargit en offrant à Moscou une relation spéciale, à sa mesure. Une relation acceptée par Moscou qui constate la vanité de ses efforts pour interdire l'élargissement. La guerre du Kosovo fracasse très vite le partenariat naissant avec l'Alliance, l'intervention contre la Serbie étant vue à Moscou comme une manifestation d'arrogance politique et de dominance militaire – au moment même où la fragile économie de la Russie « libérale » s'effondre, déclassant encore ses moyens militaires.

En définitive, le modèle pan-européen a vite échoué. Le modèle russo-américain peine à se concrétiser – la marginalisation de la Russie dans la stratégie américaine est de plus en plus claire, sauf convergence fugace d'intérêts comme dans l'immédiat après 11 septembre. Et Moscou n'a jamais, ni dans sa période de « diplomatie romantique », ni dans son retour au classicisme primakovien, considéré son partenariat avec l'Union européenne comme un axe de référence de sa diplomatie, un axe pouvant constituer le pivot de la stabilité du continent. L'Union n'apparaît donc utile ni pour organiser le continent, ni pour légitimer le rôle de Moscou dans la stabilisation de l'ancien espace soviétique, ni pour faire « chanter » sérieusement l'Amérique... Et comment reprocher à la Russie une telle vision ? La nature même de l'Union, organisation supra-nationale et union d'Etats souverains, ses difficultés institutionnelles (la mise en place

du dispositif prévu par le Traité de Maastricht et les accords qui suivent) rendent souvent son positionnement illisible. Le retour des bilatéralismes (germano-russe, franco-russe), tout comme l'échec du dialogue triangulaire entre les trois capitales, dénoncent assez le caractère incertain, dans ce domaine, de la diplomatie dite européenne.

Au-delà des protestations d'amitié, des coopérations réelles (parfois même dans le domaine militaire, comme en ex-Yougoslavie), des accords concrets dans le domaine économique, le bilan reste court. La décennie qui a suivi l'effondrement de l'Europe bipolaire n'a clarifié les choses ni d'un côté ni de l'autre. Pour Moscou, l'UE est un partenaire utile, mais pas vraiment nécessaire. Pour l'UE, Moscou est un partenaire nécessaire, mais est-elle vraiment utile ? Dans ce contexte, interviennent trois chocs : l'arrivée au pouvoir de Vladimir Poutine, le 11 septembre, et la deuxième guerre contre l'Irak.

## De nouvelles chances ?

L'arrivée au pouvoir de Vladimir Poutine change la donne à maints égards. La Russie acquiert une image de prévisibilité, de rationalité qui lui faisait défaut, relativement depuis le début des années 90, absolument depuis la réélection de Boris Eltsine. Les réformes entamées semblent annoncer une évolution de long terme vers une normalisation économique et politique dans le pays. La tentation de rééquilibrer la diplomatie russe au profit d'une coopération russo-européenne apparaît rapidement, et elle se prolonge jusqu'à l'effet d'image, en 2004 de la nomination du nouveau Premier ministre. L'ampleur du mouvement est difficilement mesurable, et ses déterminants demeurent mystérieux. S'agit-il d'un choix stratégique, ou d'une diversion tactique dans un choix stratégique qui demeure d'abord américain ?... En tout état de cause, le choix « occidental » est clairement réaffirmé, et plus rationnellement justifié : les orientations du Kremlin n'apparaissent plus systématiquement erratiques.

Le choix occidental est spectaculaire en septembre 2001. Le jeu du Président russe est rapide, brillant. Mais dans les faits, la recomposition de l'immédiat après-11 septembre oriente Moscou plus dans une direction américaine que dans une direction européenne. L'Union peine à se faire reconnaître comme acteur de l'après-11 septembre. Elle n'a pas de premier rôle dans la lutte contre le terrorisme, et la sécurité intérieure relève pour l'essentiel des Etats membres. La bénédiction du nouveau paradigme *War on Terrorism* (pour cause de Tchétchénie) et l'acceptation des déploiements américains en Asie centrale, installent Moscou dans une logique proche de celle de l'Amérique. Le point est important. Car même si les Européens sont divisés – voir, plus tard, la crise irakienne –, on sait que les réflexes américains et les réflexes européens de l'autre, diffèrent fortement face au 11 septembre. Les Européens ont tendance à privilégier les stratégies complexes (politiques, diplomatiques, économiques, culturelles, militaires...) pour traiter un phénomène qu'ils jugent lui-même complexe, quand les Etats-Unis préfèrent, eux, des stratégies de type techno-militaire. La différence se lira clairement dans le concept stratégique de l'Union élaboré en 2003.

Les événements provoquent donc à Moscou un choix occidental dans son principe, et américain dans les faits. Le caractère ambigu des relations entre l'Union et la Russie dans les temps qui vont suivre, s'explique pourtant par d'autres facteurs. Le premier est l'image pour le moins contrastée de la Russie poutinienne dans les esprits européens. Cette Russie nous pose, au moins, trois problèmes, chacun capital à sa façon. *Le premier est celui de la Tchétchénie.* Vladimir Poutine a débuté sa carrière présidentielle par là, ce qui pose question sur l'homme et sa stratégie. Au-delà, l'impasse tchétchène témoigne de l'incapacité du pouvoir russe à penser politiquement la sortie de crise, et de son impuissance à contrôler un appareil militaire devenu inmaîtrisable à la fois dans sa logique intellectuelle et dans son fonctionnement institutionnel. La Russie post-soviétique n'a pas pu redéfinir la place de l'appareil militaire dans sa propre société. Et les militaires russes demeurent étrangers aux efforts menés en Occident depuis quinze ans pour adapter les structures, et leurs modes d'action, à un monde dans lequel la violence doit toujours être utilisée, mais différemment. Pour nous Européens, ces deux constats posent tout simplement la question de l'existence et de la pérennité d'un Etat démocratique. Les Russes se sont parfois scandalisés de certaines réactions européennes, et particulièrement françaises sur la Tchétchénie. Ils doivent comprendre qu'au-delà du réflexe humanitaire face à des situations inadmissibles, la question que posent les Européens est simplement celle de la démocratie en Russie. Notre histoire nous a trop appris qu'une démocratie ne pouvait pas user de n'importe quel moyen, sauf à perdre son âme.

*Le deuxième problème est celui de la réforme et de la stabilité économiques.* En termes de croissance, les résultats obtenus par la Russie depuis quatre ans sont remarquables. Le coup de fouet productif qui a suivi l'effondrement de 1998, la hausse des cours des matières premières qui forment l'essentiel des exportations russes, les réformes qui ont dynamisé l'économie interne et ouvert l'investissement étranger, expliquent largement ce redressement. Mais les réformes qui transformeraient profondément les entreprises russes demeurent inachevées. Le dynamisme à l'exportation repose presque exclusivement sur les matières premières : un effondrement des cours de ces dernières serait catastrophique. La Russie vit donc largement sur une économie de rente pétrolière et gazière. Quant à l'investissement étranger, loin d'atteindre les niveaux espérés il est suspendu à de nouvelles étapes réformatrices, et à la sortie de l'affaire Youkos, qui clarifiera la position de l'Etat face aux grands groupes privés. On peut certes comprendre que la préparation de l'élection présidentielle ait rendu difficile l'accélération de réformes rarement populaires. Mais les décisions prises dans ces domaines durant les prochains mois seront cruciales pour la perception européenne de l'avenir russe.

*Le troisième problème est celui de la réforme politique.* La Russie doit être gouvernée – ce que Vladimir Poutine s'efforce de faire, par contraste avec son prédécesseur –, et son fonctionnement institutionnel peut même être spécifique : ces deux idées sont désormais familières à l'ouest de l'Europe. Mais elles n'empêchent pas quelque perplexité. L'inlassable concentration « verticale » du pouvoir signifie-t-elle que le pouvoir ne contrôle pas grand-chose, ou que le pouvoir contrôle tout ? Les deux hypothèses sont

mauvaises pour la démocratie russe... Les résultats des dernières élections présidentielles, couplés aux sondages d'opinion, manifestent un soutien massif sans véritable approbation du pouvoir. Ils reflètent sans doute au premier chef l'absence d'une société politique, sans laquelle la mécanique électorale reste illusoire. Les réflexes des partis d'opposition, qui ont pratiquement déserté le champ de bataille de l'élection présidentielle, ne traduisent cette même absence. Quant à l'hypothèse selon laquelle l'édifice constitutionnel pourrait être modifié pour autoriser un troisième mandat présidentiel, elle ne va pas non plus dans le sens de la normalisation politique. Or pour les Européens, la démocratisation russe n'est pas seulement moralement souhaitable. Elle est stratégiquement nécessaire à la stabilisation de la société, à son développement, à la valorisation de ses cartes (son niveau d'éducation, son savoir scientifique, qui peuvent s'affirmer dans des coopérations de recherche, etc.), et donc à une coexistence pacifiée.

Inversement, l'image de l'Union est brouillée à Moscou. L'élargissement spectaculaire qui vient d'intervenir y a sa part. Ce qui est clair, c'est l'intégration dans les institutions de l'Union de pays qui en étaient proches pour des raisons historiques, géographiques et culturelles. Ce qui est moins clair, c'est ce que sera demain l'Union à 25, la manière dont elle réussira, ou non, à se gouverner, dont elle organisera ses futurs élargissements, et les relations qu'elle entretiendra avec son extérieur – où demeurera la Russie... En bref, cette Europe nouvelle manque de clarté à la fois sur sa gouvernance interne et sur sa géopolitique : la manière dont elle se pense dans le monde, et dont elle pense l'action qu'elle entend y mener.

L'Union pourra-t-elle, à l'avenir, produire une politique étrangère cohérente, en harmonie avec les politiques étrangères de ses Etats membres ? La réponse dépend de facteurs politiques – la vision qu'ont ses membres des compétences de l'Union –, ainsi que de facteurs institutionnels – l'organisation de l'Europe à 25, jusqu'à présent assez mal pensée et mal préparée. Il est au demeurant difficile de savoir quelles seraient les orientations d'une telle politique commune, non tant hors d'Europe où l'accord est souvent plus facile à réaliser, que dans l'entourage immédiat de l'Union, sur le continent même : dans son *voisinage*. L'élargissement qu'elle vient de vivre déplace le centre de gravité de l'Union vers l'est. Il renforcera donc sûrement l'importance de la Russie comme voisin majeur. Mais quels choix exprimeront cette importance ? Le poids de la Pologne, l'héritage des relations entre les nouveaux entrants et Moscou, leurs visions particulières de leurs espaces proches (l'Ukraine, la Biélorussie, voire la Turquie), seront désormais des éléments lourds de la définition d'une politique européenne.

C'est bien la capacité de l'Union à produire des choix politiques qui importe, et non la capacité des Etats qui la composent à coopérer techniquement – cette dernière étant nécessaire mais pas suffisante. D'où l'étrangeté d'une Politique Européenne de Sécurité et de Défense (PESD), que nous nous efforçons de vendre à nos partenaires avec un très relatif succès. Assez incompréhensible dans sa complexité – pour tout ce qui concerne par exemple les hypothèses de participation d'acteurs non membres de l'UE –, la PESD a pour principal défaut de ne correspondre à aucune politique étrangère claire. Le problème n'est donc pas celui de la PESD,

mais celui de la PESC (la Politique Etrangère Supposée Commune...) Le bilan de l'année 2003 est bien sûr cruel. Les interventions européennes en Macédoine, en Bosnie, ou au Congo, ne cachent pas l'échec à s'entendre sur la question plus fondamentale de l'Irak. L'Union se fût-elle accordée sur la question irakienne début 2003 qu'elle aurait pu demander à Moscou une position plus nette. Les choix français, allemand, russe, dans la crise, ont été fixés unilatéralement, fondés sur des critères particuliers à chacun des trois acteurs, et n'ont à aucun moment constitué un axe diplomatique. Chaque capitale rejetant d'ailleurs fortement l'idée de l'existence d'un tel axe.

L'anarchie diplomatique européenne se traduira, début 2004, par une autre brillante démonstration : le Rapport de la Commission de Bruxelles sur les relations avec la Russie étant suivi immédiatement des déclarations opposées du Président français... Le développement de forums bilatéraux (franco-russe, germano-russe...) aux résultats pour le moins inégaux, manifeste tout autant l'incapacité des grandes diplomaties européennes à s'articuler dans une démarche homogène vis-à-vis de la Russie.

### Quel partenariat ?

Laissées de côté les proclamations sentimentales et les fausses évidences géopolitiques, le partenariat peut se fonder sur des arguments essentiels. Proches, l'Union et la Russie le sont de plus en plus. Elles ont donc intérêt à organiser leur voisinage. Pour des raisons et à des degrés différents, la Russie et l'Union ont besoin de l'ouverture des marchés de l'autre. Et Moscou ne peut se passer, pour le relèvement de son économie, des investissements européens. Le partenariat économique inclut évidemment le volet énergétique. Pour les Européens comme pour les autres, la redéfinition de la géographie énergétique mondiale constitue un enjeu fondamental des décennies à venir. Les incertitudes du Moyen-Orient, la montée en puissance des économies asiatiques, l'imprévisibilité de la politique américaine, installent d'évidence la problématique énergétique — et la Russie en est une composante majeure —, au cœur de la géopolitique des puissances. Autre dimension des réflexions prospectives : la démographie. Nul doute qu'elle soit elle aussi centrale dans les décennies à venir, en particulier *via* la question des migrations. Si l'on combine problème des migrations et problème sanitaire, on retrouve encore plus la Russie comme partenaire obligatoire de l'Union. Enfin, les enjeux de sécurité imposent eux aussi un partenariat. Stabilisation régionale, lutte contre les réseaux terroristes, freinage de la prolifération des armes de destruction massive sont, à horizon prévisible, trois tâches majeures pour les systèmes de défense des pays développés. Sur ces trois fronts la Russie pèse très lourd.

Des coopérations existent certes, et elles se poursuivront pour l'essentiel de ces domaines entre Bruxelles et Moscou. Si l'on souhaite les organiser, les dynamiser dans un partenariat politique à la fois plus symbolique et plus efficace, les deux côtés doivent répondre à quelques conditions déjà mentionnées. Du côté russe, la reprise des réformes économiques ; un approfondissement démocratique qui suppose stabilité et transparence institutionnelle, ainsi que le dialogue avec les forces émergentes de la société politique ; une ouverture de l'appareil militaire, qui modifie sa place dans

la société, ses structures, ses savoir-faire, et donc ses capacités à coopérer avec les autres.

Du côté européen, beaucoup de choses dépendent de la gestion de l'élargissement. Si les chicanes institutionnelles (entrée en vigueur de la Constitution, des nouvelles règles de fonctionnement à 25, d'un nouveau budget commun) sont vite franchies, l'Union aura une chance de digérer normalement les difficultés qui tiennent à sa nouvelle taille et à l'inégalité de ses membres ; et elle gardera les moyens d'intervenir dans son voisinage, dans le cadre d'une diplomatie et d'une action de paix commune.

Il est pourtant aujourd'hui difficile de dire si l'Union choisira de se penser comme un système auto-stabilisant, tourné pour l'essentiel sur ses propres problèmes – qui deviendront de plus en plus lourds au fil des élargissements –, ou comme un acteur compact doté de capacités de manœuvre extérieure. Si l'on s'en tient aux éléments visibles, l'Union est aujourd'hui plus proche du premier modèle que du second. Si cela devait se confirmer, alors le partenariat entre Moscou et les pays de l'ouest de l'Europe passerait par des axes concurrents : avec Washington, avec Bruxelles, avec les éventuels noyaux durs des coopérations diplomatiques européennes (Paris-Berlin, par exemple...)

En tout état de cause, il est peu vraisemblable que les membres de l'Union européenne s'entendent à court terme sur une autonomisation croissante de la PESD par rapport à l'Alliance atlantique. La tendance actuelle serait plutôt inverse : jouer ses cartes, pour pourquoi pas en profitant des difficultés à venir de l'Amérique, pour alourdir le poids européen dans une Alliance dont ni Washington, ni les nouveaux entrants, ni la plupart des anciens membres de l'Union ne souhaitent diminuer le rôle. La discrète évolution française dans sa collaboration avec les structures militaires de l'Alliance est sans doute un signe parmi d'autres de cette évolution.

Sur le fond, la PESD ne peut se développer qu'autour d'un minimum d'accord diplomatique entre membres de l'Union, et ce minimum ne peut se cristalliser sur une logique de rupture avec l'Amérique. Autrement dit, la diplomatie commune européenne ne pourra s'affirmer, à court terme, qu'en proximité avec Washington. A ce terme donc, et c'est paradoxal compte tenu des événements irakiens, le mouvement vers Washington risque d'être le plus visible. Plus tard, le poids renforcé des Européens dans l'Alliance leur permettra peut-être de prendre quelque distance avec l'autre rive de l'Atlantique, si les visions du monde, ou les intérêts, se confirment différents. Mais ceci ne sera possible que si les Européens gardent une autonomie dans leurs capacités à analyser le monde, sa géographie, ses tendances, ses menaces, ainsi que dans leurs capacités industrielles et technologiques. Rien ne sert de proclamer son indépendance si l'on n'a pas les moyens techniques de prendre une décision propre, et de l'appliquer.

Et nous retrouvons ici la logique du partenariat russo-européen. Les Français sont parfois tentés de proposer la coopération avec l'Union comme alternative au dialogue avec l'Amérique. Ils ont tort. Comment choisir entre la puissance dominante et une puissance en voie de constitution ? Nous ne savons pas vraiment ce que sera dans vingt ans la carte institutionnelle de l'Europe. Il s'agit donc de maintenir et développer les instruments dont nous pourrions avoir besoin dans toutes les circonstances, toutes les configurations.

Le partenariat russo-européen est l'un d'eux. Quelles lignes pourrait-il privilégier – hors coopération économique ?

1. *La coopération diplomatique et militaire.* Elle ne peut se développer qu'à partir d'une approche commune des problèmes (cadre juridique de résolution, types d'actions à mener, modalités des décisions, etc.), des zones à considérer, et des capacités de coopération entre les appareils militaires et de sécurité intérieure. A l'extérieur, figurent d'évidence au nombre des zones qui nous concernent solidairement les Balkans, l'espace caucasien, et la zone moyen-orientale (plus précisément israélo-palestinienne). Le partenariat de sécurité ne peut en aucun cas signifier que tous les problèmes deviennent communs, ou font l'objet d'un traitement commun. La coopération doit être simplement possible, quand elle est nécessaire. L'échange entre appareils militaires devrait, au-delà des négociations d'états-majors, avoir pour objectif de générer une véritable culture de sécurité commune. Cela suppose que l'appareil militaire russe s'ouvre largement : formation des officiers à tous niveaux, dialogue sur les savoir-faire militaires, coopération technique. Une telle coopération multiforme permettra seule de dépasser les complexes croisés de nos armées : de supériorité pour l'Ouest, d'infériorité pour les Russes.

2. *La coopération technique et industrielle.* Elle est une des conditions du maintien de l'autonomie européenne dans la maîtrise des technologies modernes, et en matière de production d'armements. Chaque côté a ici ses cartes à jouer. Les Européens ont intérêt à se déprendre d'une certaine frilosité dans leur coopération avec la Russie. Les potentialités russes combinées aux capacités – parfois mal exploitées – des Européens peuvent, dans des domaines clé (espace, information, aéronautique...) prendre un poids considérable. Or l'on sait que la capacité à contrôler un certain nombre de technologies critiques, et à les faire déboucher sur des productions industrielles, constituera demain un critère majeur de hiérarchisation de la puissance dans le monde.

3. *La coopération « intellectuelle »* est sans doute un élément fondamental pour la définition future du continent européen. Elle suppose une circulation des hommes – à organiser en fonction des nouvelles règles de voisinage, dans le cadre de l'élargissement – qui peut seule générer une culture commune, ainsi que l'organisation d'échanges suivis en matière culturelle et de recherche. L'Union européenne a le devoir d'aider à l'émergence d'une nouvelle Russie scientifique et universitaire – et pas seulement à Moscou et à Saint-Pétersbourg...

4. Au-delà, *l'échange entre Russes et Européens sur leur approche des grandes tendances du monde*, sur les évolutions à venir des équilibres stratégiques, sur les menaces émergentes et les moyens d'y parer, est capital. Cet échange se développe dans de multiples institutions ou centres de recherche. La création d'un réseau permanent pourrait aider le dialogue à s'installer dans le long terme, entre les communautés intellectuelles et politiques russes et européennes.

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identifient mal leurs stratégies respectives, et parce qu'elles manquent de visibilité l'une sur l'autre. Pour d'évidentes raisons géographiques, historiques, stratégiques, culturelles, leur partenariat s'impose dans le paysage de l'avenir. En insistant sur des choix pratiques, opérationnels, les deux acteurs majeurs du continent européen pourraient rêver de construire ensemble un avenir commun, même s'il est encore difficile d'en cerner les contours. Ce faisant, ils soigneraient aussi leurs complexes. Du côté de l'Union, le désespérant mélange des sentiments de supériorité, et de faiblesse. Du côté de la Russie, les vieux fantômes de la puissance, le sentiment de déclassement, et la fascination d'une orgueilleuse solitude, désormais impossible.

# The Russia-EU Strategic Partnership: Prospects and Principles

*By Dov Lynch*

## Introduction

Over the last five years, advances have occurred in Russian-EU relations. The relationship has become heavily institutionalized with a network of mechanisms linking Brussels to Moscow. The declared 'strategic partnership' has taken on depth on a number of levels. An 'energy dialogue' has been launched. Russia participates in the EU's first ESDP operation, EUPM, in Bosnia. Cooperation has become rich on questions of nuclear safety and the non-proliferation of weapons and materials of mass destruction. The EU and Russia have reached a number of common positions on important foreign policy questions.

Yet, EU-Russia strategic cooperation displays worrying features. While heavy in institutional mechanisms of interaction, the substance of the declared 'strategic partnership' between Brussels and Moscow is far from well developed. Relations are high on rhetoric, but the actual partnership is light on substance. The dialogue on security questions is wide but thin. Moreover, economic interdependence between the two has not spilled over into greater political cooperation. While there is quite high convergence between Brussels and Moscow on a range of foreign policy questions, there have been few cases of joint action. As a result, relations seem to lurch from one crisis to the next – from the question of Kaliningrad in 2002 to enlargement in 2004. The crisis-prone tendency reflects partly Russia's diplomatic style in approaching the EU and partly the EU's style – its placid, technocratic approach to relations with Russia that will move only if seriously shaken.

The underlying reality is that, for the past five years, Russia and the EU have been busy with questions other than their partnership. Russia has been caught up in an internal consolidation process, entailing reform and also the restoration of central power over Chechnya. For its part, Brussels and member states have been preoccupied with enlargement question as well as the Convention and negotiating the European Constitution. As such, neither Moscow nor Brussels can be blamed for not having much time or energy to devote to the other. Moreover, in security terms, neither party was pressed to engage urgently with the other. The EU was engaged in the quelling further Balkan crises, in which Russia was not an absolutely necessary partner, while Russia was caught up with the conflict in Chechnya. Finally, European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) has been nascent over the last five years, with a host of fundamental questions that had to be resolved between member states and in relations with the NATO. Russia has not been seen to be vital part of the birth of ESDP; at least, not yet.

## Forces of urgency

The benign neglect that has characterised the EU-Russia strategic partnership since 1999 is no longer tenable. Several developments lend urgency to the need for a genuine strategic partnership between Brussels and Moscow.

First, enlargement has carried with it the objective requirement for both Brussels and Moscow to review its impact on their relations. In January 2004, the Russian government put to the EU a list of fourteen concerns with enlargement, ranging from the quantitative limits on Russian steel exports, Russia's grain quota, tariff questions, barriers against Russian agricultural exports to the non-application of restrictions on Russian energy supplies and the sustainable development of Kaliningrad<sup>1</sup>. The direct impact of enlargement on Russia is felt at three levels:

- a) *Economic/trade questions*, with the EU now Russia's most important trading partner;
- b) *Social/humanitarian questions*, regarding Russian-speaking minorities in the Baltic states and access to the Kaliningrad region;
- c) *Security questions*, regarding the EU-Russian security cooperation.

Second, the enlargement of the EU alters the political geography of Europe. Despite already sharing a border on Finland, the EU and Russia now stand much closer to each other. The new geographical reality raises a host of *questions of proximity* in EU-Russian relations, with regard to such issues as border cooperation, environmental control, and visa facilitation. Moreover, the enlargement of the Union has created a new shared region of countries between Russia and the EU, in Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova. Whereas both Russia and the EU have interests in this border zone, very little cooperation has emerged between Brussels and Moscow. With enlargement, such neglect is no longer viable.

Third, despite the declared 'strategic partnership' and increased contacts between the Union and Russia, security cooperation has not developed deeply. As it will be discussed below, while the dialogue has cleared ground on a range of subjects, substantive cooperation is lacking.

Fourth, policy misunderstandings as well as policy differences have risen. Within the EU, member states had become concerned with developments in Russia that called into doubt the existence of shared values as a foundation for the 'strategic partnership.' Similarly, the Russian government had also become concerned that the EU was unable or unwilling to listen to its concerns with the effects of enlargement. Policy differences arose very clearly over developments in Moldova in November and December 2003.

Finally, there is urgent need for a deeper EU-Russia strategic partnership because of the rise of *New Europe*. Some of the mists of confusion are lifting over the shape of European security, which has been shrouded in uncertainty

<sup>1</sup> *List of Russian Concerns in the Context of EU Enlargement* (January 19, 2004: unpublished)

since the end of the Cold War. Many of the forces driving the rise of new Europe are linked to the EU itself, while others are tied to changes with NATO and US strategic thinking.

Enlargement will deeply impact on the EU foreign policy. First, because the EU will have new member states, which will bring urgency to questions that may not have received much attention, including those of concern to Russia. Second, the enlarged Union has new borders that bring new urgency to the EU thinking about the periphery. For much for the 1990s, the EU 'foreign policy' – if this is the fitting term – revolved around the question of membership/non-membership: if membership was on the cards, the EU had a full policy; if it was not, there was little policy. This is changing, with the birth of the EU as a fuller foreign policy actor, able to think and act beyond the simple dichotomy of accession/non-accession.

For all the clarion calls of the death of CFSP, the EU was born as a security actor in 2003, with its first civilian and military operations deployed in the Balkans and Africa. Moreover, the Iraqi crisis stimulated the development of a EU *Security Concept*. A major point of the *Security Concept* is the need to have a belt of well-governed countries on the EU's periphery, thus reinforcing the emergence of a strategic EU view of its borders, the threats that rise from states on its periphery and appropriate responses to them. What's more, in late 2003 and early 2004, France, Germany and Britain have agreed to the development of specific operational goals for ESDP, under the 'battle group' concept. For all of its difficulties, ESDP is alive and kicking.

Non-EU related developments driving the rise of a new Europe are tied to changes in the role of the NATO, and in particular the expansion of its responsibilities to the global level. NATO's withdrawal from direct military responsibilities in the Balkans and its assumption of tasks in Afghanistan marks an important trend, in which the EU will assume a more central place in European crisis management. The shifts in US strategic thinking, underway in the force and posture transformation process, also augur a shift away from a heavy presence in Europe towards the south and the east. The rise of a new Europe, and specifically the central role the EU is taking on in this, makes a substantive EU-Russia strategic partnership all the more vital.

## The strategic dialogue

For its difficulties, the EU-Russia political dialogue is more frequent than it is between the EU and any other third party. In addition to semi-annual summits, the EU and Russia entertain consultations between the EU's Political and Security Committee (COPS, the main EU body concerned with security decision-making) and the Russian ambassador in Brussels. Meetings between the EU Military Committee chairman and Russian Defence Ministry officers first occurred in May 2002. Later that year, Russia assigned an officer as liaison to the EU Military Staff. The

<sup>2</sup> See author's 'Russia's Strategic Partnership with Europe,' *Washington Quarterly* (27:2, Spring 2004, pp. 99-118).

dialogue has five dimensions<sup>2</sup>. It is worth reviewing these before discussing the obstacles that have emerged in the partnership.

First, Russia and the EU have sought to coordinate positions on wider foreign policy issues. In the Balkans, the EU has taken the lead with Russia's consent, while cooperation in the Middle East has been relatively greater and more equal, even if both stand in the shade of the United States. Dialogue on the former Soviet Union has been limited. The EU has sought to discuss Russian policy toward the conflicts in Moldova and the South Caucasus and to address the question of Belarus but to little avail. Despite similar views on a number of international security questions—ranging from the role of the United Nations to that of the Quartet — the dialogue has produced few meaningful joint positions.

Second, Brussels and Moscow have exchanged views on concepts of conflict prevention and crisis management. In 2001, the Russian Defense Ministry developed proposals for joint activities involving military crisis management with the EU, and, in 2002, the Ministry for Emergency Situations presented its concept for civilian crisis management. However, the fact that the EU has not yet developed its own concepts has prevented cooperation from advancing.

At Seville in 2002, the EU worked out modalities for the participation of Russian forces in the EU crisis management operations that call for the EU to start an intensified dialogue in case of an emerging crisis to inform Russia if an operation is under consideration<sup>3</sup>. After the formulation of a 'concept of operations,' Russia may be invited to participate and attend a force generation conference that would bring together potential contributors to an operation. If Russia provides 'significant forces,' Moscow will have the same rights as participating EU member states in the so-called Committee of Contributors, the main body for operational management of the ESDP operation in question. Russia's involvement in the EU Police Mission in 2003 marked the first application of the procedures for Russian participation in a EU led and commanded operation.

Third, September 11 brought counterterrorism to the table. In 2001, the EU and Russia agreed to exchange information on terrorist networks; not to allow such groups on their territories; to block their financial sources; and to exchange intelligence on dubious transactions<sup>4</sup>. In 2002, Russia and the EU pledged to cooperate in bringing to justice the 'perpetrators, organizers, and sponsors of terrorist acts.'<sup>5</sup> Cooperation in the struggle against organized crime may be seen an indirect facet of their cooperation in counterterrorist activities and was made official by an EU joint action

<sup>3</sup> *Presidency Report on ESDP*, 10160/2/02 REV 2 ESDP 188, Annex IV, Arrangements for Consultation and Cooperation Between the EU and Russia on Crisis Management, Brussels, June 22, 2002.

<sup>4</sup> *Statement on International Terrorism*, EU-Russia Summit Press Release 342Nr 12423/01, Brussels, October 3, 2001.

<sup>5</sup> *Joint Statement on the Fight Against Terrorism*, Russia-EU Summit, Brussels, November 11, 2002.

<sup>6</sup> *European Union Action Plan on Common Action for the Russian Federation on Combating Organized Crime*, Report no. 2000/C 106/02, Official Journal C 106, 13/04/2000, p. 0005-0012.

plan to combat organized crime in the Russian Federation<sup>6</sup>. Meetings of the Justice and Home Affairs Ministers have started.

Fourth, Russia has been keen to develop military-technical cooperation in areas of perceived comparative advantage. Europe's lack of strategic airlift capabilities has long been noted, and Russia has offered its capabilities to fill the gap. However, European states have decided to develop a specifically European capability. Moscow has proposed that the EU draw on Russia's satellite imaging capabilities to bolster ESDP. The EU Satellite Centre has purchased Russian satellite images in the past, but no special relationship has been established.

Finally, Russia and the EU cooperate in questions of nuclear safety and disarmament. Both parties maintain similar stances on the need to reinforce multilateral arms control and disarmament agreements. In December 1999, the EU approved a joint action establishing a Cooperation Program for Non-Proliferation and Disarmament in the Russian Federation. The program supports the development of a nuclear safety culture and the creation of appropriate monitoring agencies in Russia. Since the June 2002 G-8 summit in Kananaskis, EU programs have become part of a wider effort to support the dismantling and securing of Russia's nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, agents, materials, and infrastructure<sup>7</sup>.

In all, Moscow and Brussels have cleared ground and laid out future directions. Nonetheless, the dialogue remains nascent and largely declaratory. Serious challenges impede its meaningful progress.

## Challenges to the strategic partnership

First, at the most basic level, Russia and the EU are different kinds of actors<sup>8</sup>. Russia is a sovereign state, with a consolidating political, economic, and military system; an elected leadership dedicated to advancing the state's interests; and institutions that coordinate means to reach desired ends. The EU is nothing of the sort. It has divided institutions, unclear sovereignty, a weak sense of common interests, and few institutions in the political area that are able to achieve independently the EU's declared objectives. The dialogue brings together a state that is defensive about its sovereignty and territoriality with an association where sovereignty is pooled and territoriality diluted. Europe is as much a union of interests as a community of shared values. Moscow sees the blending of values and interests in the EU policy as interference. The EU statements about the Chechen conflict have only provoked irritation in Moscow, as have declarations about the need for the fair application of the rule of law during the Yukos affair.

Second, the EU and Russia entertain different views of the EU security policy. For Moscow, ESDP should advance Russian interests by providing

<sup>7</sup> For more on EU programs in this area, see Kathrin Hoehl, Harald Mouller and Annette Schaper, "European Union," in *Protecting Against the Spread of Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Weapons: An Action Agenda for the Global Partnership*, vol. 3: *International Responses*, Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, January 2003).

<sup>8</sup> See also the discussion of Marius Vahl, *Just Good Friends? The EU-Russia "Strategic Partnership" and the Northern Dimension*, CEPS Working Document, no. 166, Brussels, March 2001.

a model of European security that ensures Moscow an equal voice on all security questions, and more broadly serves as instrument to create a 'Greater Europe.' The EU sees ESDP in a different light. For Brussels, ESDP is a limited instrument of EU foreign policy. Future EU operations have a similarly limited scope and objectives: their aim is solely to manage crises that arise.

As such, the modalities for Russian involvement in ESDP operations fall short of Russian demands. Optimally, Moscow seeks equality with EU member states at all levels of decision-making, that is, a joint assessment of a situation and agreement on whether it constitutes a crisis, followed by joint planning as well as command and control. For the EU, non-EU states may participate in an ESDP operation if they desire to do so, and if their participation is considered necessary by the EU, yet external involvement allows for only that—*involvement*, little more. Even if a non-EU party provides significant forces to an ESDP operation, according to the Seville arrangements, that state may not be invited to draft the concept of operations.

The conditions for Russian involvement in EU operations are less accommodating than those for NATO operations. Linked to this problem is the EU's vague stance on whether it will seek a UN mandate for all its operations, a point on which Brussels has been wilfully ambiguous. Moscow is also concerned by the growing geographical scope of EU operations, and specifically that the EU is considering deploying operations spanning a radius of 4000 kilometres from Brussels. The concern is that ESDP will follow the path of the OSCE, one that comes to narrow its focus on Russia. Russia seeks to be a subject of ESDP, not its object.

Finally, factors specific to Russia and the EU have hampered the dialogue. Russian policy is heavily presidential. The vast bureaucracies of government standing behind Putin are sometimes more conservative. In Brussels, the dispersal of decision-making power among different institutions affects the EU's ability to interact strategically with Moscow.

## Proposals for deepening partnership

One approach to bridging the gap in the strategic dialogue resides in a more effective institutional framework to link the Union and Moscow in a permanent dialogue on questions of mutual concern. In this spirit, the EU-Russia summit in St Petersburg in May 2003 agreed to create a 'Permanent Partnership Council,' designed to act as a clearinghouse on all matters of cooperation. The Permanent Partnership Council met for the first time on April 17, 2004, at the ministerial level, and agreed to the Joint Statement on Enlargement and the Protocol for the extension of the PCA to the acceding countries. While not irrelevant, this solution highlights a classic reflex to seek an institutional answer to a question that requires substantive thought.

Five years on from the EU's de facto defunct *Common Strategy on Russia* and myriad number of rhetorical declarations of strategic partnership later, EU-Russian relations must become less ambitious in rhetoric and

more concrete in substance. The EU-Russia security dialogue has devoted enough time to declarations. Without practical, ground level cooperation, the dialogue faces the danger of collapsing into a heap of words and recrimination. The EU-Russia strategic partnership must become an integral part of the new Europe in the making.

The Union and Russia cooperate already on an impressive range of security questions already. However, developments in 2003 and 2004 have highlighted divergences of perception and policy that undermine the partnership. In order to move forward, the EU has little choice but to recognize the limits that it faces with Russia and to seek insistently to engage Russia on those questions where the gap exists. The areas where policies diverge are such that they can no longer be ignored or swept away for another day.

### **How to build a new Europe without dividing lines?**

The premises on which Russia and the EU founded their policy of benign neglect towards each other since 1999 no longer exist. These premises were that Russia and the EU were not really all that close geographically, that both Russia and the EU were deeply busy with their own house-cleaning needs, that ESDP barely existed beyond paper and the NATO was the central European security provider. All of these things are changing.

Cooperation must start on questions that bring together both urgency and interest for the European Union and Russia. Optimally, these questions should address concerns that have arisen in Moscow over two developments – enlargement and the rise of the EU as Europe's security provider. Finally, the questions should be ones where both the EU and Russia have the means to act.

Conflict settlement in Moldova satisfies all three criteria. With enlargement to Romania in 2007, the EU's external borders will abut with Moldova's, bringing onto Europe's doorstep a host of problems, from human trafficking to illicit smuggling. Moldova is Europe's poorest country, and the conflict with Transnistria lies at the heart of most of its problems. The OSCE has been involved for over ten years in negotiations between the two parties, but with little success. The Maastricht failure in December 2004 has thrown doubts over the OSCE's ability to *lead* the settlement process. In the right conditions and with a delicate approach, this area of failure in 2003, which highlighted new dividing lines that seemed to be emerging, may be transformed into an area of success in Russian-EU relations.

Work could occur on two levels. These are not necessarily linked and do not have to be successive:

(1) *Develop a Joint Conceptual Framework for Peace Support*

First, Brussels and Moscow must follow through on the point agreed at the Brussels summit in November 2003 to define a 'standing framework on legal and financial aspects to facilitate cooperation in crisis management operations.' There is little reason for the 2002 Seville arrangements to remain fixed forever, especially if these do the Union a disservice in precluding operations with Russia in our new shared borderland. As much as the

NATO has developed a positive framework for peace support with Russia – as it has in operations on the ground and in the political agreement of September 2002 – so should the EU. Flexibility and creativity is required, mainly from the EU and member states but also from Russia, but not in inordinate amounts: there is almost a decade of experience with Russia in the Balkans to draw on.

To formulate a *Joint Conceptual Framework for Peace Support*, the modalities and conditions of joint operations must be discussed and worked through.

(2) *Work jointly on the Moldovan case*

2003 was a year of clashing approaches to the settlement of this conflict. It was also a year of learning about the need for joint action. In order to exit the dead-end currently in place and to avoid future developments from becoming new points of tension, Moscow and Brussels must develop a common position.

Work could occur at two levels. First, Russia and the EU could develop a common view of a fitting constitutional arrangement to solve the conflict. This is already more or less agreed to by the main external mediators. Second, Brussels and Moscow could elaborate a joint peace consolidation mission to underpin an agreement. Although current modalities for Russian participation in EU operations allow for only a limited Russian voice, undertaking a *joint* operation will require *joint* command and control, as well as *joint* responsibility. Such a joint operation would require rethinking the Russian peacekeeping operation, which has kept the peace since 1992, in order to underpin a settlement through the opening of relations on the Dnestr and the demilitarization of the conflict.

The impact of such joint work would be four-fold:

First, Russia and the EU must work out together an understanding of how to cooperate in crisis management and peace support in Europe. The Seville arrangements were negotiated between EU member states and then presented unilaterally to Russia. While this posed no tragedy in 2002 when the EU had not yet undertaken operations, in 2004, with the new Europe becoming more clear and, with it the central role of the EU, a joint conceptual framework on crisis management and peace support between Russia and the EU is critically important.

Second, cooperation over Moldova has an excellent chance of securing the settlement of a conflict on the EU's and Russia's vulnerable eastern periphery. This is important for the success of the EU's *Wider Europe* program with Moldova and the creation of a belt of well-governed states on the Union's periphery. It would also represent an important success for Russia in setting joint foundations for a new Europe without dividing lines.

Third, a joint EU-Russian approach would impact positively across the range of EU-Russian relations. The design and deployment of an operation would go far in assuaging Russia's concerns with ESDP. Both Brussels and Moscow should welcome a joint approach to the conflict, if it is presented appropriately and developed in a spirit of cooperation.

Finally, cooperation in the new and shared periphery between Russia and the European Union would represent a powerful signal of a genuinely common security space arising in the new Europe.

# Difficulties and Obstacles on the Way to Russia-EU Strategic Partnership

*By Alexander Nikitin*

The goal of establishing and promoting *strategic partnership relations* between the European Union and Russia was once again nailed down in the text of an EU Security Strategy, adopted at the end of 2003. It was not the first (and probably not the last) proclamation of such a positive goal in relations between Moscow and Brussels. There are good and understandable reasons for urging such a goal now, in the process of reformation of the European Union towards meeting new threats and challenges of the first decade of the XXIst century.

Arguments in favor of strategic partnership are out of question and well discussed in the analytical literature. At the same time there are serious difficulties and obstacles on the way towards such a partnership, and they must be discussed and analyzed with no less attention.

## Blurring the ‘Strategic Partnership’ formula

During the decade after the collapse of the Soviet Union new independent Russia seriously reshuffled its foreign policy values and priorities. As the former Chief of the Russian General Staff Gen. A. Kvashnin liked to formulate it, the task was “to convert adversaries into neutrals, neutrals into partners, and partners into allies”.

The formula of “strategic partnership” was a little bit overused by Russia, being applied on different geopolitical directions. First of all, marking the end of the Cold War in the first half of the 1990s Russia, in contrast with the previous Soviet ideology, proclaimed strategic partnership with the United States and the West as a whole. First edition of such a partnership belonged to the early 1990s policy of the then Foreign Minister A. Kozyrev, second edition followed events of 9/11, 2001 and took a form of a proclaimed “anti-terrorist coalition”.

Secondly, in the mid-1990s relations of Russia with China, and with India – great southern neighbors of Russia – were also redefined as a strategic partnership relations<sup>1</sup>.

Thirdly, relations within the CIS between Russia and 11 of former republics – now newly independent states – were not anymore ideological “brotherhood” but calmed down to rational strategic partnership. And when mechanism of the CIS already performed its historic role of a tool for a relatively peaceful divorce between parts of the formerly united country, then nickname of “strategic partners” was saved for 6 member states of the Orga-

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<sup>1</sup> Foreign Minister (and later Prime Minister) E. Primakov initiated a formula of a “strategic triangle Moscow-Delhi-Beijing”, though reactions both from China and India were cautious, and initiative went nowhere.

nization of Collective Security Treaty (CSTO) – those whose partnership was now really based upon legally binding military-strategic integration.

Fourthly, both “Founding Act on Relations Between the Russian Federation and NATO” (1997) and basic documents of NATO-Russia Council (NRC) which entered XXIst century in a format of “20 states” named strategic partnership to be a target format for NATO-Russian relations.

As a result, introducing of the format of “strategic partnership” for the relations between the EU and Russia occurred to be less meaningful than it could be, as far as the very term and notion of strategic partnership was blurred in a geo-strategic space starting from the USA and the NATO at one side and ending with Russian Central Asian allies and China, at the other.

### **Political principles of strategic partnership**

Wide use of a strategic partnership formula during the last decade allowed to fill “partnership” basket with some more or less commonly recognized principles. Among such principles which could constitute content of EU-Russia strategic partnership the following could be listed:

- good political interface between the sides, and mutual “no surprises” policy<sup>2</sup>;
- structuralization and institutionalization of political and military dialogue in form of regularly acting joint organs and structures<sup>3</sup>;
- good level of mutual transparency and information exchange<sup>4</sup>;
- work on joint concepts of crises response, preparation and implementation of joint or well coordinated security actions and counter-actions<sup>5</sup>;
- elaborating standards and practicing measures towards operational interoperability, in purely military matters, as well as in a broader security sector actions;

<sup>2</sup> Exactly this “no surprises” principle failed to work in March of 1999 within NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council when NATO allies decided to start bombings of Belgrade without UN Security Council resolution. Russian Prime Minister E. Primakov, literally caught by the news in the air on the way to the West, ordered to U-turn his plane back home as a gesture of diplomatic protest.

<sup>3</sup> Exemplified by new NATO-Russia Council or set of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) organs like Council of Heads of States, Council of Defense Ministers, Council of Secretaries of National Security Councils, etc.

<sup>4</sup> It worth to mention that in 2003 a direct “protected hot line” of communication between the Russian Minister of Defense and the Secretary General of NATO was established, following old time practice of hot line existing between the Kremlin and the US White House.

<sup>5</sup> Interesting example of coordinated parallel security actions was given in 1991 by Bush and late Gorbachev administrations, when deliberate withdrawal of US tactical and medium-range nuclear missiles from Europe allowed Moscow to withdraw urgently all tactical nuclear weapons from all Soviet Republics onto the territory of the Russian Federation, thus avoiding proliferation of tactical nukes into hands of 14 independent states.

Opposite example of lack of coordination in security actions between strategic partners was given at the moment when the USA requested the right to use airfields in Central Asia in course of operation in Afghanistan in 2002, and Russia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan were responding with controversial uncoordinated statements, though continuing urgent uneasy consultations with each other.

- joint participation in conflict resolution and peacekeeping missions;
- working level of exchange of data and practical cooperation between Internal Affairs ministries, police organs in counter-actions against terrorism, fight against organized crime, border guard and customs cooperation;
- cooperation in crises response, civil emergency situations and between civil emergency and humanitarian assistance services and agencies;

### “Narrow” circle of EU-Russia strategic issues

EU and Russia decided to experiment with strategic partnership in the historic period when main security concerns and challenges (Iraq, Afghanistan, North Korean nuclear ambitions, Middle East endless hostilities, counter-terrorist actions, etc.) lay far from the line of touch between the EU and Russia. There is not so much real beef to place into the oven of partnership right now. And so issues of status and format of partnership have become ill-meaningful.

In fact, Russia and the EU have relatively limited list of issues where their security interests border each other (contradict or converge). This list may include:

- cooperation (political and military) on settlement in former Yugoslavia;
- residually tensed dialogue on security implications of Kaliningrad issue;
- interaction on Moldova/Transnistria settlement;
- EU involvement into conflict resolution in the Caucasus where it will come in touch with Russian interests;
- security aspects of regulation of migration (including visas and passports issues);
- modes for potential participation of Russia in EU police or peace support operations in crises areas, both inside or outside Europe, and organization of *joint* operations;
- steps towards interoperability between the EU and Russian tools of crises response (to be born rapid reaction forces, peacekeeping contingents, civil emergency forces, etc.);
- new modes of border and customs control regime at emerging borders between the EU and Russia (in Baltic States, and between Eastern European countries and Belarus/Ukraine/Moldova);
- cooperation of internal affairs and police structures in fight against terrorism, organized crime and narcotics;
- European assistance to Russia in elimination of WMD and excessive fissile materials;
- issues of spread of adapted CFE and other arms control agreements onto new EU member states, as well as of Russian compliance with the adapted CFE ceilings and quotas (including Russian military

- withdrawal from Moldova and Georgia);
- issues of regional security cooperation in areas like Baltic Sea and Black Sea where the EU and Russia touch upon each other through participation in regional international organizations.

### **“Wider” security partnership**

Such a list contains a “narrow” interpretation of security partnership, as far as it includes only issues where the EU and Russia directly interface with each other in the security or military sphere. In a “broad” or “wider” interpretation though such a list may also include issues of coordination of more general policy lines and principles between the EU and Russia in such a world-scale issues as:

- policies inside the UN and coordination of positions in the process of elaboration and adoption of UN SC resolutions;
- policies of security crises settlement in other areas of the world (e.g. the Middle East, North Korean nuclear challenge, Indian-Pakistani conflict, etc.);
- policies of post-conflict settlement in Iraq and Afghanistan;
- world scale counter-terrorism efforts;
- cooperation in implementation of CWC and BWC and other multilateral disarmament treaties;
- joint efforts in promotion of Missile Technologies Control Regime (MTCR) and Export Control Regime, etc.

### **EU-Russia “points of contact”: Yugoslavia, Moldova, Caucasus**

Moscow is less and less sure that it has a special position on settlement for former Yugoslavia, be it Bosnia, Kosovo or FYROM. Russia already withdrew its peacekeeping contingents from B&H and from Serbia-Montenegro (which before were in proximity of 1,500 Russian soldiers and officers in each of the international NATO-led operations). After the EU will fully take leading responsibility for operation in Bosnia, any new Russian participation in former Yugoslavia would need to establish interoperability with EU military structures. That wouldn't be difficult by itself, but for both Russia and the EU that would be one of several bottlenecks where their security machines really touch upon each other cooperatively.

Conflicts in Caucasus (namely in Abkhazia/Georgia and South Ossetia/Georgia, much less often in Nagorny Karabakh, and rarely in Chechnya) are from time to time suggested as an object of potential mediation from the side of the European Union. In general Moscow considers South Caucasus to be within its sphere of interests and even speaks of “four Caucasian powers: Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Russia”.

In such a context European presence in Caucasian settlement is

instinctively perceived as “unnecessary”<sup>6</sup>. At the same time rigidity of Russian attitude varies. Moscow is almost not involved in Karabakh settlement (only through multilateral Minsk group). As it is known, OSCE peacekeeping operation for Karabakh, mandated by OSCE in 1993 with participation of Russia, occurred to be abortive and was not implemented. So Moscow could be tolerant to the idea that any other “external” forces, be it the EU or even the USA, could try to play a role in this settlement.

On the contrary, Moscow is highly sensitive to European attempts to mediate in Chechnya. In 2002 the mission of OSCE was expelled from Chechnya. After the elections of the President of Chechnya in 2003 Moscow started to present the case as “politically resolved”, and military operation there as finished. At the same time assassination of Chechen elected President in 2004 showed that the case is far from conciliation, and organization of last Presidential elections for Chechnya brought to the surface necessity to have international, including European observers to bless legitimacy of elections.

Conflict resolution in South Ossetia/Georgia is de facto in a better shape than many other surrounding conflicts. Approximately from 1997-1998 the process of political settlement went quite actively, and now there seems no need in real external mediation or involvement, neither from Europe, nor even from Russia.

As for conflict in Abkhazia/Georgia, that one seems to die hard. After coercive repression of Adjarian separatism in April-May 2003 by Tbilisi, all attention of Tbilisi, inspired by “victory” over Adjaria, is redirected against old separatism of Abkhazia. Growing of tensions there becomes almost inevitable. And in such a moment official Georgia addresses EU, as well as the UN or even the NATO as to external mediation force, as it already did in the past. So the conflict in Abkhazia may really become a point of dangerous touch between Russian military and diplomatic interests and forces involved in Abkhazia, and new European initiatives. Of course, ideally the EU and Russia could approach settlement in Abkhazia cooperatively as “team members”. But for Moscow that would mean open or indirect recognition of its diplomatic and military failure after 10 years of involvement in Abkhazian settlement. And the EU may be not interested to serve under guidance and command of Russian peacekeeping forces commanders in Abkhazia. The case is even more complicated because formal mandate for Abkhazian settlement has been issued and renewed by the CIS, not by Russia alone. So the EU is facing a challenging task to outperform the CIS as another regional organization.

Finally, the EU is already involved into peaceful political settlement for Moldova/Transnistria. Here willingness of the EU to play some role coincides with already traditional pressure from the OSCE (and now from the EU too) towards Russia to withdraw residual military contingents from Moldova and finally obey to CFE quotas. The views of the EU and Moscow onto the nature of Transnistrian regime are quite different. And obviously there will be no easy negotiations on political status of Transnistria under the EU aegis. By the circumstances and logic of negotiations Moscow could

<sup>6</sup> Probably, in the same sense in which D. Lynch calls Russian participation in settlement in former Yugoslavia “unnecessary” (see a paper by D. Lynch above).

shift towards supporting directly or indirectly Tiraspol more than it would in absence of the EU mediation.

As a result, cases of EU real or potential involvement in settlements of Moldova and Abkhazia could become (and already are in a sense) points of certain frictions of interests between Russia and the EU in security area.

### **Differences in “security cultures”**

One more difficulty in developing working strategic partnership is an *absence of disarmament, arms control and verification “culture”* in relations between Russia and EU. Such an “arms control culture” emerged in relations between Soviet Union (later Russia) and the United States of America during several decades starting from the 1970s<sup>7</sup>. Mutual work on elaboration, verification and implementation of the disarmament and arms control treaties involved many thousands of military, engineers, lawyers, various experts from both sides working together. Only in the course of implementation of US-USSR Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty more than 20.000 experts took part in more than 1.000 inspections from both sides.

Of course in Europe there was a lengthy process of elaboration of CFE Treaty on conventional forces and weapons in the 1980s and its adaptation to changed geopolitical situation in the late 1990s. CFE Treaty involved practically all NATO and former Warsaw Pact countries, but it was elaborated through the channels of CSCE/OSCE. The EU structures never were involved in it. As a result, EU Military Committee and Military Staff never were seriously involved in regular negotiation practice with the Russian military. If sides are serious about strong security interface, then practical active interface between the military structures should be reconsidered and promoted.

### **“Value-centered” or pragmatic partnership**

It remains a controversial question, whether or not EU-Russia partnership should be necessarily based upon deep unity of values (liberal interpretation of partnership), or could it be more pragmatically limited to coordinated actions towards common goals, irrespective of difference in values and motivations (conservative interpretation of partnership). On the level of political rhetoric it is not difficult for Russian leadership to proclaim that Russia shares basic values of the European Union, like political democracy, pluralism, market economy and respect to human rights. But, firstly, these values are not yet deeply rooted in Russian social texture and in minds of all strata of Russian society, and, secondly, even Russian political leadership may understand and interpret some of them differently from Western counterparts when it comes to applications of such values to concrete cases. As a result, strategic partnership with the EU is

<sup>7</sup> First series of significant bilateral arms control and disarmament treaties has been concluded between the USA and Soviet Union since 1972 (ABM Treaty and SALT-1 Treaty), followed by SALT-2 and INF in the 1980s, START-1 and START-2 in the 1990s, and, finally, SOR Treaty in 2002.

mostly interpreted by the Russian side in a pragmatic conservative sense, in terms of partnership based upon coincidence (may be temporal) of national interests, rather than social values.

Obviously, strategic partnership is a weaker mode of relations than military or security alliance. That is a mode of interaction between actors yet significantly distanced (not only geographically, but rather politically and operationally) from each other. Strategic partners are in (broader or narrower) agreement regarding far-reaching general political goals (say, regional stability or ending certain local conflict), but may differ in middle-range or tactical issues and policies. Strategic partnership do not require coordination of all aspects of policy. It leaves room for specificity, disagreement, reservations unless it undermines the partnership as such.

At the same time, Moscow has a record of “Treaties on Friendship and Mutual Understanding” with a number of countries back in the Soviet years (including such uneasy “friends” as self-minding Tito’s Yugoslavia and Sadat’s Egypt, not speaking of North Korea or Libya), and in some of such cases “friendship” and “alignment” were weaker and more distanced than today’s interpretation of “partnership”.

## Political psychology difficulties between Russia and EU

In international relations, partnership must be interpreted as an elaboration of solid interaction between actors and presence of tested and working instruments able to help to resolve any dispute, rather than an absence of disputes as such. Such an interpretation is more or less natural for Western tradition of democracy and parliamentarism, but not well accepted in Russian political establishment.

May be it is a residual feature of Soviet ideological tradition, but Moscow still often interprets partnership as a prohibition of any criticism of partners and from partners. If a typical Western approach is “we are partners, so I can criticize you”, typical Russian approach remains “if we are partners you must not criticize me”. Russian side reacts nervously to any manifestations of, for example, external criticism of the state’s internal policies. If EU practice of endless coordination between member states helps in elaboration of culture of relative tolerance, Russia remains very sensitive to the “interference into internal affairs”.

Level of globalization of Russian politics and of the very texture of social life is lower than in EU countries. Psychology of the former superpower which is accustomed to set international rules rather than follow them is working as a factor of difficulty in relations with EU. As D. Lynch of EU Security Studies Institute rightly points it out, Russia seeks to be a subject of ESDP, but doesn’t want to be it’s object<sup>8</sup>.

<sup>8</sup> See a paper by D.Lynch above.

## **Wrong tactics: juxtaposing EU to NATO**

One of the obstacles to normal development of Russia-EU partnership in strategic and military affairs is the fact that Russian political establishment juxtaposes the EU to the NATO, and considers Russian relations with the EU as a balancier (or even revenge) to Russian relations with the NATO. Such a distorted picture of European affairs was formed between 1996, when the first wave of NATO enlargement has become a serious perspective, and 1999, when the crises stroked Russian-NATO relations as a reaction to unmandated bombings of Yugoslavia. That time a simplified Hollywood-type “black and white” image was coined of “return of bad NATO” in contrast to “coming of good EU”.

In this respect decision on merging between the WEU and the EU was very discouraging for Russia. Before Moscow had expectations that European Security and Defense Identity would be formed aside from the NATO, in no relation to it, and in a sense would become a counter-weight for the NATO. But using the WEU (which always has been in fact almost a part of NATO structures) as a seed for future EU military capabilities undermined ill-directed expectations of Moscow. And promotion of Javier Solana, former NATO Secretary General to key position in EU security was a last drop which showed to Moscow that there would be no real split between military sides of the EU and the NATO, at least no politically usable split.

Russian illusions regarding juxtaposing the EU to the NATO are comparable to wrong tactics of constant stressing of cracks or gaps in Transatlantic link between the USA and European members of the NATO. Both tactics represent a kind of wishful thinking residual to Cold War times intention to undermine the NATO from any possible direction.

## **Wrong tactics: levelling Russia to EU standards**

EU, in its turn, creates a problem of misunderstanding by instinctively applying to Russia a “standard procedure” of tackling it as one of the nation-states which can (and need) coordinate its policy, values, economic behavior to the EU standards, if not immediately, then at least in tendency, if Russia wants to have any interaction with the EU. Going through many cycles of accession dialogue with uneasy nation-state partners (Denmark, Turkey, Cyprus, Eastern European and Baltic states, etc.) Brussels elaborated a habit of perceiving a dialogue between “the Union” and “a State” in terms of inequality by definition. The Union is perceived as by definition more valuable (at least because it already represents “a collective will”) than any country. The fact that Russia is a big well armed country and a former superpower doesn’t help and even worsens the gap. EU member states were constantly making precautions in the process of EU formation against domination or interference of another superpower – the USA. Now some (even unconscious) precautions elaborated in relations with other external giant work against smooth relations between the Union and Russia.

## **Loosing and re-establishing of European status of**

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## Russia

Russia is especially sensitive towards the issue of the real as well as symbolic place which it gets around the table of European security decision-making. During all the time after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia was struggling to keep or to get a place around such a symbolic table. More than once during the 1990s Moscow panicked that it is “pushed out of Europe”. Such fears expressed themselves, for example, during 1999 Istanbul summit of the OSCE, where President Yeltsin, being severely criticized for policies in Chechnya and Moldova, warned that Russia may even withdraw from the OSCE and refuse to sign adapted CFE Treaty, as reaction to pushing Russia “out of the European family”.

Fears of loosing the status of a decisive European power manifested themselves also in several attempts of Russia (by initiatives of Primakov, and later by Putin) to promote Russia to “great Asian power” by urgent accession to various non-European international organizations, from ASEAN and APEC to Organization of Islamic Conference<sup>9</sup>.

Relations of strategic partnership with the EU (and even a hint in EU security strategy that such a partnership may be formed) may resolve this psychologically serious “syndrome of lost European status” for Russia. In this respect Russia is not the first and not the last country for whom sometimes status recognition (through partnership) becomes more important and meaningful than content of the partnership.

But what both Russia and the EU objectively need is not a “vision” or “camouflage” of partnership slogans or status statements. They need long practical work of filling the partnership with substance on all possible dimensions of security interaction.

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<sup>9</sup> Russia accessed to OIC in 2003.

# Russia Faces an Enlarged EU

*By Tatiana Parkhalina*

Since mid-1990's Russia's attitude towards Europe was conditioned by two major factors: by the process of NATO enlargement and by the desire to have special relations with the EU.

While the NATO was nominated to be “the main enemy”, the relations with the EU were declared (since 1994) to be of high priority for Russian policy and economics.

But it was clear to any expert who was deeply involved in European studies that the development of cooperation with the EU could not be formulated and isolated from the whole context of the relations with other international and Euro-Atlantic institutions such as the OSCE, the NATO, Council of Europe. And formation of the “environment of security and stability in Europe”, interpreted in a broader sense, taking into account political, military, economic, social, cultural, information, ecological and other dimensions, should be the strategic goal for Europe as well as for Russia. In this context both actors presupposed that without Russia it was not possible to construct such an environment.

In the second half of 1990's Russian political establishment did not realize the fact that for fruitful cooperation with the EU Russia had to reject certain stereotypes such as:

- “zero sum game option” in the field of security;
- attempts to divide two institutions – the EU and the NATO – having in mind that the majority of European states are members of both of them;
- rejection of the attempts of Central and Eastern European countries to join the NATO which made it impossible to conduct a positive dialogue with them.

At the end of the 1990's the so-called “NATO-Russia crisis” as a result of Kosovo and NATO air-strikes at Milosevich regime in former Yugoslavia had influenced relationship between Russia and the EU.

During and after the Kosovo crisis Russian politicians and diplomats tried to divide the West into “good” and “bad”: “bad” was the NATO, “good” was the European Union. This unrealistic attempt had failed and demonstrated that many critics did not understand the real nature and character of the European integration process.

When V. Putin came to the Kremlin as elected President, Russia tried to reassert its international profile on several directions:

- Undertaking bilateral dialogue with European states and the EU, spoiled by European critics of the second Chechen campaign;
- Reviving relations with former Soviet allies;
- Promoting Russian arms export.

Determinant key foreign policy principles were:

- Non-proclamation of any priorities;
- Pragmatic orientation through emphasis on economic relations;
- Use of Russia-European relations for influencing Russia-US dialogue.

The events of September the 11<sup>th</sup>, 2001 created fresh opportunities for cooperation between Russia and the West as they acknowledged graphic evidence of common threats and challenges. At the same time the processes of NATO and EU enlargement were going on.

Having realized that both of the processes are new European realities the Kremlin decided to accept the so-called “format of 20” in the relationship with the NATO and not to dramatize the second wave of NATO enlargement. Now we could stipulate that NATO-Russia relations don’t have a negative impact on Russia’s relations with the EU.

It is possible to formulate several scenarios or perspectives of the relationship between Europe and Russia. One of them is the following: An explosive moment could arise if and when Russia would realize some negative consequences of the EU enlargement for its economy. It is connected with the new visa regime, standards and norms of behavior in the field of finances and commerce and some restrictions in foreign trade. Russia is worried that the EU enlargement to the East could lead to Russia’s exclusion from the process of European integration. Another different issue is a question of Kaliningrad.

Such technical problems as visa procedure for Russians who are traveling from Kaliningrad region to Russia and back, the automatic spreading of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the EU and Russia to new member states have been transformed by Russian political establishment into political ones. The explanation of this phenomenon could be the following:

- Russian political, economic and diplomatic elites don’t understand the real sense of the “Aquis Communautaire”;
- They would like to demonstrate how they defend Russian national interests on all directions;
- They pretended to be a “tough negotiator” with the West in the field of its socio-economic interest; in a sense it is a “bargain diplomacy” (let us demand the maximum to receive something).

But in reality it is a trap for Russia itself because every time the EU, having in mind Russia’s pragmatic approach towards NATO enlargement, has to help Russia to “save face”.

In the framework of the EU-Russia relationship there is another serious problem – how Russia should perceive the European initiative of the ESDP. Before Kosovo crisis Russia expressed positive attitude towards strengthening the “European pillar” of the security of the West. At the end of 1999 – beginning of 2000 – as it was mentioned before – Russia tried again to realize its attempt to “divide the West”. In spite of the views of European politicians and experts that NATO continues to be a cornerstone of the European security system, that all EU member states are working according to the standards of the NATO in the field of security and defense, that in the majority of cases the European defense will be based on NATO

capabilities, Russian political and military elites decided to “support” the ESDP just to counterbalance the NATO.

Only later, at the end of 2000, a more realistic understanding of the real character of the process emerged:

- Russian military-political establishment understood that it is counterproductive for Russia’s national interests to perceive European defense as antipode to the NATO and to try to use it to counterbalance some NATO initiatives;
- Russia has to cooperate with the emerging EU structures. There is a good example of the EU-Russia real cooperation and dialogue – the Western Balkans:
- The issue of Western Balkans was constantly on the agendas of the EU-Russia political dialogue meetings at all levels;
- Thanks to this dialogue positions of each side were well-known.

Among those factors that shape the relationship and cooperation between the EU and Russia in the field of the ESDP one could mention:

- The EU is a unique partner with comprehensive crisis management tools;
- The EU considers Russia as a strategic partner;
- Cooperation between the EU and Russia in the field of security develops as the ESDP develops;
- The institutional settling established for political dialogue, i.e. an extensive net of meetings at all levels, provides a good basis for consultation and cooperation in issues related to the ESDP (especially meetings in Brussels between PSC Troika and Russia);
- The EU and Russia are working on the questions related to practical arrangements for Russia participation in EU-led operations;
- The process of developing the ESDP is a transparent process – the EU keeps Russia informed of its plans and developments to avoid any misunderstandings.

In general Russia’s policy towards the enlarged EU is characterized by ambivalence:

- By the desire to affirm itself as a European state and by neglecting European values, norms and standards inside the country.
- By the attempts to ensure European foreign policy and foreign economy activities through its participation in international institutions, such as WTO, G-8, OSCE, NRC and at the same time by proclaiming support to those initiative that could divide Europe (Russian position during Iraq crisis).
- In spite of the fact that Russia adapted a number of official concepts concerning foreign and European policy, there is no clear vision what could be Russia’s place in Europe and in the world, no clear understanding who are Russian partners and eventual adversaries, this resulted in reactive answers to certain events and in the absence of clear cut strategy towards Europe.

Russia should cooperate with enlarging Europe to solve the problems of its socio-economic, ecological, information, cultural security. For that

Russia and the enlarged EU should have new mechanism of cooperation – it could be a new council (instead of agreement) where both sides could discuss the most sensitive issues of their relationship, such as energetic dialogue, taxes on certain goods (aluminum, steel, textile etc.), the issues of human rights and rights of minorities, common norms and standards of behavior.

It is in the interest of Russia to support NATO-EU links.

The EU has created 3 new decision-making bodies on defense issues: Political and Security Committee; Military Committee; Military Staff. The EU has also established cooperation mechanisms with the NATO aimed at using NATO assets and meeting US concerns about the ESDP. These include regular NATO-EU meetings at ministerial level, as well as regular meetings between the EU and non-EU European NATO members. This framework allows for intensified consultations in the case of crisis. It is in the interest of Russia to join certain EU-NATO consultations, using the mechanism of NRC.

The EU agreed to “establish ad hoc committees of contributors” for EU-led missions to give non-EU participants a role in operational decision-making. Russia should have in mind this opportunity and in the case of necessity could join the EU-led operations on this level.

Together with the adaptation of 10 new member states the EU leadership does view the ESDP as one of the next great step on the way to European integration. Most EU members seek to enhance the ESDP over next decade, they assert that EU efforts to boost defense capabilities should complement the efforts of the NATO (and not compete with them). New members from Central and Eastern Europe, such as Poland and Baltic states, view this process as one that must not weaken the NATO and transatlantic links. Four neutral members of the EU (Austria, Finland, Ireland, Sweden) prefer to concentrate their efforts on the ESDP’s civilian side.

It would be in the interest of Russia to institutionalize its relations with Europe through a number of agreements, concerning eventual cooperation on such directions as use of transport aviation in the case of necessity, jointly planned operations in the case of crisis, peace-keeping missions in certain regions.

Now in the EU framework the discussion is open on the point whether to expand the ESDP activities into combating external terrorist threats or other new challenges, such as countering the proliferation of the WMD. In June 2002 EU leaders agreed that the Union should develop counter-terrorism force requirements. EU member states appear to recognize that the ESDP must have a role in addressing new challenges in order to remain relevant. On March 25-26, 2004 EU leaders announced a new “Declaration on Combating Terrorism”. Among other measures it calls for “work to be rapidly pursued to develop the contribution of the ESDP to the fight against terrorism”.

Russia is interested in cooperating with the EU in the fight against terrorism. It would be reasonable, in this context, to develop links within the context of the ESDP in its new missions. In the case of enlarging NATO–EU activities Russia could propose a working group EU–NATO–Russia to discuss different aspects of possible trilateral cooperation.

# The Implications of the EU Security Strategy on European-Russian Relations

*By Wolfgang Wagner*

## The EU's Security Strategy: background

In order to assess the impact of the Security Strategy of the European Union it is important to note its development and functions in the process of European integration. The EU member states tasked the High Representative for EU foreign and security policy, Javier Solana, to elaborate a security strategy in order to regain some common ground after the severe splits within the EU over Iraq in early 2003. A preliminary version of the strategy was discussed at the European Council in Thessaloniki in June 2003, a final version has been agreed on six months later at the European Council. The elaboration of follow-up papers is currently under way. Thus, the Security Strategy has been mainly an instrument for promoting foreign policy cooperation within the EU.

The EU Security Strategy has been elaborated by the High Representative and his staff in close collaboration with the member states, particularly the large ones. The result has been a very typical EU document in the sense that any member state may insist on having an issue added to the document that it deems of particular national importance. Thus, instead of defining clear priorities, the security strategy has to be acceptable to now 25 member states and therefore tends to list issues and instruments rather than to prioritize them.

Still, the security strategy has been a great success insofar a common paper has been agreed on in the sensitive area of foreign and security policy at a time of the EU internal divisions over Iraq. (In contrast, attempts to elaborate a EU White Book on Defense have failed at the some period.)

## The EU's Security Strategy: substance

The EU security strategy proceeds in a classical way by first identifying key threats, then by outlining strategic objectives and finally by formulating policy implications for the EU.

The documents lists five key threats, namely:

- terrorism,
- weapons of mass destruction,
- regional conflicts,
- failed states, and
- organized crime.

The basic approach of the security strategy is to recognize the multi-dimensionality of these threats and to respond with a mix of instruments. In particular, military means are regarded as one, though

the most important, means. The EU is self-conscious in claiming that it is „particularly well equipped to respond to such multi-faceted situations“.

## Implications for Russia

Except for the USA, Russia is probably the most important partner for the EU in making the security strategy work. This is because, since the latest round of EU enlargement, Russia has become a neighbor of the EU. Moreover, as a great power, Russian policies impact severely on the ability of the EU to reach their goals.

Russia's vision of the EU is likely to shift from the EU as an economic actor to the EU as a security actor. Early EU-Russian relations have been constructed around primarily economic issues including trade agreements. Fortunately, the EU is not seen as a threat but as a partner for Russia.

The relationship with Russia is likely to be measured by its contribution to countering the key threats (terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, failed states and organized crime). Each one will be addressed below in turn:

### a) Terrorism

It is important to note that the EU has taken a „sociological approach“ on combating terrorism: „It arises out of complex causes. These include the pressures of modernization, cultural, social and political crises, and the alienation of young people living in foreign societies.“ Moreover, the EU has emphasized that the combat of terrorism must not lead to violations of human rights.

As long as Russia pursues a hard line in Chechnya, conflicts are likely to emerge here. It should be noted that, even though the European Parliament has a more limited role in foreign policy than in the EC's common market, it is still powerful enough to place human rights high on the EU-Russian agenda.

### b) Weapons of mass destruction

Russia still has large arsenals of nuclear and chemical weapons and, according to some experts, experiments with biological weapons as well. It is therefore a natural partner in any effort to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

#### *Nuclear WMD*

The EU has followed American proposals to improve the safety of its nuclear material by technical and financial assistance („Cooperative Threat Reduction“). Of the 1.489 billion Euro spent via TACIS in the period from 1991 to 2001, some 800 million were directed to nuclear safety.<sup>1</sup> This figure demonstrates the priority attached to non-proliferation. Thus, in the area

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<sup>1</sup> Portela, Clara: The Role of the EU in the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The Way to Thessaloniki and Beyond, Frankfurt: PRIF Report No. 65.

of nuclear weapons, the EU may build upon a successful policy.

#### *Chemical WMD*

Russia had the largest arsenal of chemical weapons worldwide. The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons has been tasked with destroying these arsenals by a fixed schedule. Russia had difficulties in adhering to that schedule. The EU policy has been modeled on its policy on nuclear WMD. A number of programs have been designed to provide technical and financial assistance to Russia. As for nuclear weapons, this policy has been successful and should be pursued further.

#### *Biological WMD*

In the area of Biological WMD, the multilateral efforts for an effective control are much weaker in comparison to the regulation of nuclear or chemical WMD. The greatest stumbling block on the way to a more effective regime has been the Bush administration. Thus, in the area of Biological WMD, Russia will be less important for the EU whereas efforts should be targeted at the USA.

### **c) Regional conflicts**

The EU and Russia, first of all, share an interest in solving the regional conflicts (for example, in Chechnya) and in further stabilizing the Western Balkans (Russia is explicitly mentioned as a partner in the Balkans by the Security Strategy). So far, Russia has participated in EU-led police missions in Bosnia and Macedonia. It has not yet participated in any military missions (neither in Macedonia nor Congo) but its participation in police missions indicate that Russia is prepared to have its military integrated into multinational missions under a common (European) command. Also, Russia had contributed to IFOR in Bosnia. This could become a model for military collaboration in addressing the regional conflicts.

The security strategy explicitly mentions Russia in the context of the Middle East “quartet”. For the EU, a peaceful solution of the Arab/Israeli conflict is regarded as a „strategic priority“.

### **d) Failed states**

State failure is seen to result from corruption, abuse of power, weak institutions and lack of accountability, i.e. bad governance.

Russia and the EU seem to emphasize different strategies here: whereas Russia first and foremost stresses strong institutions (a strong state), the EU has emphasized democratization as a way to improve governance. Both strategies are not mutually exclusive but complementary. Thus, there are ample opportunities for the EU and Russia to cooperate on preventing state failure. The most likely candidate for cooperation in this area has been Moldova. With the next round of enlargement, Moldova will have common borders with the European Union. The EU therefore has a vital interest in a stable and prosperous Moldova.

The strategy mentions that the EU „should take a stronger and more active interest in the problems of the Southern Caucasus“.

### **e) Organized crime**

The EU has become very active in promoting the joint combat of organized crime. In addition to establishing an „area of freedom, security and justice“ within the EU, it has sought to build collaborative ties to third countries. For example, agreements have been reached with third countries on exchanging police data via Europol and on extradition. It has been a precondition, however, that the judicial systems in cooperating countries adhere to strict standards of human rights and democracy. As extradition politics has demonstrated, this is likely to remain a zone of conflict between the EU and Russia. It seems important to remind Russia that the adherence to these standards is non-negotiable with the EU. As the example of the US has demonstrated, even a widespread notion that an accommodating stance vis-a-vis the USA is politically desirable, the USA were not granted any privileged access to the EU's new extradition regime due to concerns over the death penalty and military tribunals.

## Conclusion

Taken together, the rise of security issues on the European agenda makes Russia an even more important partner to the European Union. The EU security objectives will be difficult to realize without cooperation with Russia. For Russia, this implies that the EU will no longer be met primarily as an economic superpower that may or may not grant access to its markets and provide support in the process of transformation. In contrast, the EU will now also appear as a partner for security cooperation. As a result, the overall relationship may become more balanced than before.

However, EU-Russian relations are also likely to encompass more conflicts. Human rights violations, corruption, bad governance or organized crime are no longer perceived by the EU as internal problems of states but as impacting on the EU's security as well. To the extent that Moscow hesitates to tackle these issues and tolerates them as a means of influencing its “near abroad” (e.g. in Belarus, Moldova), it is likely to meet European concerns. In contrast, to the extent that Russia contributes to combating the root causes of terrorism, it should be able to receive broad support from Brussels.

# European Security Strategy and Russia's Interests

*By Andrey Kazantsev*

## 1. ESS and European policies towards Russia within the context of ESDP

The European Security Strategy (ESS) is the result of a long-term ambition to enhance political cooperation among the EU member states drawing future contours of this cooperation. It exists within the context of Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), and also of its key element – European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). These policies are legally based on the Treaty on European Union (1993).

In this respect, the ESS is a logical step forward on the long way of developing European cooperation in security area that could be traced back in time for, at least, half a century.

In relation to Russia the ESS should be analyzed within the context of some other documents of CFSP – “Partnership and Cooperation Agreement” (1994), «Common Strategy Towards Russia» (1999), etc.

The ESS has already become a basis for some other documents in the field of security. For example, “Declaration on Combating Terrorism” adopted after the Madrid bombings contains the reference to the ESS. Some other follow-up documents are being developed. So, the ESS has become a document that should be taken very seriously by all EU partners, including the Russian Federation.

### Origins of ESS

The document titled «A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy»<sup>1</sup> was prepared by the office of Javier Solana, the European Union High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy. A preliminary version of the ESS was discussed by the European Council in Thessaloniki (June 2003) and it was adopted by the Brussels European Council in December 2003. It is the first ever European Security Strategy. Before this the main priorities in the area of security and potential tools to tackle them had been regarded as purely national issues.

For correctly evaluating the ESS it is necessary to take into account the circumstances surrounding its development and adoption. First, it was created after 9/11. It made more active involvement of Europe into solving international security problems inevitable.

Second, the ESS was formulated during the Iraq crisis when the differences between some European countries and the USA became menacing to old transatlantic relations. It also caused a split between the EU countries

<sup>1</sup> A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy (ESS). Paris, The EU Institute for Security Studies, 2003.

themselves. In this period, Donald Rumsfeld, a defense secretary of the USA, attacked “old Europe”, and the EU external relations Commissioner Chris Patten sriced back at US “unilateralist overdrive”. In this dangerous situation Solana tried to find some mutually acceptable compromise points between “pro-American” and “anti-American” EU countries.

As a result the strategy looks sometimes like “the lowest common denominator”. A comparison between two variants of the ESS text representing different stages of the work over the document is especially interesting in this respect. It indicates intention of the authors to mitigate the wording of the text. This desire to satisfy everyone makes the text of ESS very contradictory and uncertain.

## Structure and main ideas of ESS

The ESS consists of an Introduction, three main parts and Conclusion. Three main parts have the following titles: 1) the security environment: global challenges and key threats; 2) strategic objectives; 3) policy implications for Europe.

*Introduction* analyzes the role of Europe in today’s world and identifies the objective for the EU to share the responsibility for global security and to build a better world.

The *first section of the ESS first part* depicts the situation of globalized world and shows new dimensions of security emerging as a result of different global challenges.

The *second section of the ESS first part* identifies five key global threats that increase instability: international terrorism (especially, religion-based one), WMD proliferation, state failure, regional conflicts and organized crime. However, despite the rhetoric of the Bush administration, all these factors are distinct concerns.

*The second part of the ESS* outlines three strategic objectives.

Firstly, the EU needs to address the threats, to be more actively involved in international affairs. For this purpose more energetic and coherent policies are required. The threats should be responded at an earlier stage. Proactive policy through a variety of means ranging from financial and administrative measures to political and economic pressure, humanitarian missions, civilian crisis management and military peace-enforcement is needed.

Secondly, the ESS strategy reaches out to contribute to stability and good governance in the EU neighborhood: the Eastern Europe, the Mediterranean, the Middle East, the Balkans and the Southern Caucasus.

Thirdly, the ESS recommends to the EU to contribute to an international order founded on effective multilateralism, international institutions and law-based international order. In this respect, the role of the UN and UN Security Council as well as of other international and regional institutes and organizations is emphasized.

*The third part of the ESS* formulates policy implications for the EU. For accomplishing the identified tasks, European foreign policy should be more active, more capable, and more coherent. The EU should also more

actively work with its partners.

In *Conclusion*, the ESS states that in a new globalized world the European Union has the potential to make a major global scale contribution to an effective multilateral system leading to a safer, more fair and united world.

## **Conceptual differences between ESS and Russian views on security**

Some observers believe that ideologically the ESS is close to the official position of Russia as well as to the views shared by the majority of Russian political elite. They refer to stressing the role of the UN and international institutions, “wider” approach to security issues (taking into account cultural and social aspects), etc. as some examples of this. Besides, the ESS text is formulated so vaguely as to satisfy both adherents of strong alliance with the USA and supporters of more independent European external policy (the proponents of “multipolarity”). So it can be interpreted as, at least, “friendly neutral” to “multipolar” concept which is so popular among Russian political elite from the time of Evgeny Primakov (when he was a Foreign, and then a Prime minister this concept was intensively introduced into Russian political lexicon).

Of course, there are some conceptual similarities. However, here we would like to emphasize *conceptual differences* that are hidden under different interpretations of terms, different cultural backgrounds and diverse world-views. Stressing similarities is very good for practical cooperation. Analyzing differences, in its turn, has greater academic value since it can reveal hidden obstacles on the way of cooperation. So, we would, in turn, analyze differences in the sphere of basic understanding of international relations and institutions; value-orientation and value realization; multilateral approach to world affairs; and, “wider” security interpretation.

Ideologically, the ESS is formulated in the spirit of liberal institutionalism. In this respect it opposes to neorealist, neoconservative and classical realist approaches that emphasize the role of enforcement in international relations and skeptically appreciate positive potential of international cooperation. The last approaches combined with mutually contradictory practical steps and ideological views of “isolationist” and rude “global dominative” character have become deciding for Bush administration.

At the same time, from the Russian point of view the ESS contains some features theoretically and ideologically similar to Bush administration’s “neoconservatism” and “neorealism”. For example, it stresses universal and effective character of European (or Western) values and standards. The very possibility to effectively cooperate with other countries is linked to adherence to “common values” and common institutions, under which Western and, namely, European values and institutions are understood.

In relation to Russia it is maintained that the respect for common values will reinforce the progress in the direction of strategic partnership.<sup>2</sup> Taken isolated this thesis is absolutely correct. Common values *do* enhance cooperation. *But for many representatives of Russian political elite there to*

*cooperate under imposed standards and agenda of cooperation (how they perceive a European approach) sounds almost like to surrender to external pressure (how they perceive an American one).*

The problem here is, first, how deep these values are really common and, second, how to apply these values in practice. Russian political elite is more or less implicitly divided on the issue whether Russia is a European, Asian or singularly and uniquely “Eurasian” country. So many Russians either have non-European values or interpret these values differently. Besides, values are not realized automatically. Here we have another source of contradictions between the Europeans and even Western-oriented part of Russian political elite.

Theoretically, there are two possible approaches to value application: deontological (values *should* be applied even if the whole world is destroyed as a result – “pereat mundus, sed fiat justitia”) and consequential (values are taken as reference points for actions in the environment which is often hostile to their realization). Unfortunately, Europe sometimes mixes both using this for double standard formation. It applies to itself *consequential approach* to human rights’ values (such as visa regulations, Kaliningrad transit problem, Russian minorities in Baltic states’ problems, etc.) and economic freedom values (the issues of restrictions on Russia’s export, Russia’s WTO entrance, etc.). But in case of internal Russian problems a *deontological approach* is wholly applied on such issues as Chechnya, actions of law enforcement agencies and fate of Russian “oligarchs” (Khodorkovsky, Gusinsky and Berezovsky cases), mass media freedom, etc. This double standard value realization policy causes resentment and alienation of liberal part of Russian political elite towards Europe.

Even in the cases when double standard application of values is not applied, there is still a possibility to immediately realize liberal values in Russian environment, which is economically, socially and culturally improper for these values in many respects. This problem is often ignored by the Europeans (more by European press and public, less by EU countries’ authorities).

Besides, value-oriented European approach was quite in harmony with more ideologically oriented Yeltsin-style foreign policy (which was often associated with Foreign minister A. Kozyrev). Nevertheless, it is in clear contradiction with pragmatic Putin-style foreign policy.

Many representatives of Russian political elite, especially its conservative part, even believe that European value-oriented approach *is much more coercive than even conservative and pragmatic American (Republican) one*. They are afraid that Europe under the cover of friendly and cooperation-oriented rhetoric tries to softly impose on Russia a new identity and radically change the nature of its institutions. Besides, they fear that Russia will get nothing material in return, in contrast to Eastern Europe, whose population accepted a new European identity simply to get a material reward by becoming a part of Western world. Moreover, this part of Russian political elite is afraid that such European pressure will increase instability inside the country. They perceive European policy towards Chechnya as an acid test for this.

The third ideological proximity between Solana's doctrine and Russian position is "multilateral" orientation. This proximity is also sometimes misleading. Even European proponents of "multilateralism" would dislike the interpretation of this notion, which is widespread in today's Russia.

The ESS clearly indicates specificity of European vision of future world order. This "multilateralist" vision prioritizes cooperation between different states and coalitions. The ESS prefers collaboration to enforcement. It represents an attempt to formulate security doctrine permitting conversion of all possible international interaction to positive sum games.

However, liberal "multilateralist" ideas of the ESS are quite different from "civilizational pluralism" (as it was quite moderately formulated, for example, by former UN Secretary General Butros Gali or by former Iranian president Mohammad Hatami) or from conservative "multipolar" vision of the world order, which is, in fact, more close to "civilizational pluralism" than to liberal "multilateralism" (as described, for example, by former Russian Prime Minister Evgeny Primakov). Since European liberal multilateralism is sometimes called a "multipolarism", it can be easily mixed with conservative Primakov-style "multipolarism". Let's reveal the differences between two "multipolarisms".

European "multilateralism" is a variant of liberal institutionalism. It dreams of effective world order based on international institutions and organizations providing the basis for cooperation of different actors. Of course, this cooperation would be based on spreading European values. Undoubtedly, there are many common features with Russian slogans of just international security policy (for example, international law supremacy and a great role for the UN). But Russian political class sometimes tends to mix liberal institutionalism with Primakov's "multipolarity" or "civilizational pluralism". This clearly opposes such an approach to ESS ideas.

ESS approach differs from "civilizational pluralism" since it implicitly proposes to base the system of international cooperation on originally European, or Western standards and values. This creates secondary differences between the models, juxtaposing "multilateralism" to "multipolarity".

European "multilateral" model differs from Russian "multipolar" model conceptually as well as pragmatically. From theoretical perspective, "multipolar" approach presumes equilibrium of forces in greater degree than institutionally based global cooperation (in this respect it is closer to classical neorealism as formulated, for example, by Waltz<sup>3</sup>). Besides, "multipolar" model draws its popularity from traditional isolationism, from aspiration to restrict involvement of international institutes and organizations into the issues that are believed to be a matter of national sovereignty (or an attribute of peculiar "civilization"). Finally, European "multilateralism" envisages a very important (and, probably, even dominating) role for "Western" international actors. But "multipolar" model or "civilizational pluralism" strive for restricting the ability of this kind of actors to influence international affairs. In this context, the attempts by Primakov to construct a "triangle" Russia-China-India to counter American and European influence can be reminded.

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<sup>3</sup>Waltz K.N. Theory of International Politics. Reading (Mass.), 1979.

So, there is only one point of proximity between Russian-style “multipolarity” and European multilateralism and this point is rather practical, than ideological. Both paradigms try to increase international influence of respective powers (Russia and Europe), to force Americans to take this influence into account and, at least, not to act so unilaterally as the Bush administration does.

Finally, one more ideological proximity between the security doctrine and Russian position is “wider” interpretation of security. The ESS contains very wide, holistic approach to security problems. It takes into account the problems of poverty, underdevelopment, ecological and social degradation and other kinds of threats to global stability. In this respect, it represents an alternative to more narrow approach to guaranteeing security, which is widespread in the USA today.

This is very close to present day Russian position. However, the text of ESS takes in account mainly economic, social and ecological aspects of guaranteeing security, while cultural aspect is mostly ignored (the only exception is the already mentioned idea of universal spreading of European values).

### **ESS and Bush administration: ideological differences and practical similarities**

Many analysts note that one more common feature between Russian position and the ESS is a cautious approach to the policy of Bush administration strategy and the principles that underlie it. This is true in general, however, there are some nuances.

Irrespective of conceptual differences with the Bush administration described above, the ESS is characterized by clear attempts to rapprochement between the EU and the US on a range of practical issues. The ESS almost always comes to some pragmatic implications close to American ones starting from absolutely different theoretical background. For example, the ESS stresses the necessity of direct European involvement and immediate EU reaction in the cases when the rules of international organizations or the clauses of international agreements are breached. The necessity of using force in international relations is something in common between the neoconservative approach and the ESS. However, the ESS states that the use of force is necessary just for guaranteeing effective functioning of international treaties and organizations as well as for effective multilateral cooperation based on them. This is liberal justification of the same practical actions that can be differently warranted from the neoconservative perspective.

The ESS is characterized by hard approach to weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation and terrorism. It emphasizes the need for more active European participation in fighting these global evils. This also draws Europe and the USA together. The ESS also attaches great importance to transatlantic solidarity (“The transatlantic relationships is irreplaceable”<sup>4</sup>). This formula unequivocally rejects the views of the creators of different new alliances (alternative to transatlantic solidarity) in the field

of security (for example, as it was in the case of “the triangle” Berlin – Paris – Moscow).

However, some of final ESS formulations are mitigated so as to satisfy the partisans of the Bush administration as well as its opponents. For example, a clear-cut formula “pre-emptive engagement” in the earlier variant of the ESS was replaced by more vague “preventive engagement”.

As it was already mentioned the ESS identifies five key global threats that increase instability. However, unlike the rhetoric of the Bush administration and its allies (Tony Blair inside Europe itself is the most prominent among them) international terrorism, WMD proliferation and state failure are theoretically distinct concerns. In the ESS different threats are not necessarily linked with one another. However, it is stated that if all five elements came together, Europe would face a radical threat. So, the defenders of Bush administration’s policy can say that in case of Iraq all elements have just come together.

As for Russia, its cautious approach to the policy of Bush administration is more practical than theoretical. Russia is simply looking for more rewarding alliances. In this respect it should be recalled that some representatives of Russian political elite (conservative as well as liberal) proposed to support American action in Iraq for adequate compensation using this Russian-American concord (or even its threat) as an instrument to pressurize Europe on disputed issues.

## Russia in ESS

Russia is mentioned in the ESS text extremely often and always in positive or neutrally positive context:

*1) as one of the most important sources of vital energy imports (together with the Gulf and Northern Africa):*

“Energy dependence is a special concern for Europe. Europe is the world’s largest importer of oil and gas. Imports account for about 50% of energy consumption today. This will rise to 70% in 2030. Most energy imports come from the Gulf, Russia and North Africa.”<sup>5</sup>

*2) as an example of successful multilateral cooperation in the Balkans:*

“Our task is to promote a ring of well-governed countries to the East of the European Union and on the borders of the Mediterranean with whom we can enjoy close and cooperative relations. The importance of this is best illustrated in the Balkans. Through our concerted efforts with the US, Russia, the NATO and other international partners, the stability of the region is no longer threatened by the outbreak of major conflict.”<sup>6</sup>

*3) as a part of Middle East’s “quartet” of the USA, the EU, the UN and Russia:*

“The two state solution – which Europe has long supported- is now widely accepted. Implementing it will require a united and cooperative effort by the

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<sup>4</sup> ESS, P. 22.

<sup>5</sup> Op. cit., P. 8.

*European Union, the United States, the United Nations and Russia, and the countries of the region, but above all by the Israelis and the Palestinians themselves.”<sup>7</sup>*

4) in the context of Russia’s WTO entry negotiations as an example of economical globalization (alongside with China):

*“China has joined the WTO and Russia is negotiating its entry. It should be an objective for us to widen the membership of such bodies while maintaining their high standards.”<sup>8</sup>*

5) as a strategic partner, a major factor behind European security and prosperity:

*“We should continue to work for closer relations with Russia, a major factor in our security and prosperity.”<sup>9</sup>*

For reference, the USA are mentioned also 5 times; China – 2 times; India, Canada and Japan – only once. This quantitative side of the text of the ESS sets Russia apart from all other possible strategic partners of Europe (except for the USA). However, it does not equalize Russia’s meaning for guaranteeing European security to that of American. At the end of the document, in the section titled “*Working with partners*”, in listing strategic partners, one can differentiate three strata by the respective country’s position in the text as well as by its content.

The first place is occupied by the USA:

*“The transatlantic relationship is irreplaceable. Acting together, the European Union and the United States can be a formidable force for good in the world. Our aim should be an effective and balanced partnership with the USA.”*

The second one by Russia:

*“We should continue to work for closer relations with Russia, a major factor in our security and prosperity. Respect for common values will reinforce progress towards a strategic partnership.”*

The third one – by Japan, China, Canada, India and others:

*“In particular we should look to develop strategic partnerships, with Japan, China, Canada and India as well as with all those who share our goals and values, and are prepared to act in their support.”*

However, even this second important (after the USA) position in the ESS causes some dissatisfaction among the representatives of Russian political class (see, for example, the article by *Dmity Danilov* above).

From the point of view of the regions where Russia has some vested interests ESS mentioning of Eastern Europe, the Balkans and the Southern Caucasus deserves attention. It is very interesting that Central Asia was not referred to in the document. The ESS presumes that European role in all listed regions should be enhanced. This can cause (especially in the case of

<sup>6</sup> Op. cit., P. 15.

<sup>7</sup> Op. cit., P. 13.

<sup>8</sup> Op. cit., P. 17.

<sup>9</sup> Op. cit., P. 20.

the Caucasus) some anxiety on the part of Russian political class. At the same time, the ESS emphasizes that increasing European role in the regions mentioned above should be accompanied by the growth of cooperation with all interested sides (including Russia).

From Russian point of view it is also important that the ESS contains reference to avoiding creating new dividing lines in Europe as a result of the enlargement. *“It is not in our interest that enlargement should create new dividing lines in Europe. We need to extend the benefits of economic and political cooperation to our neighbours in the East while tackling political problems there.”*<sup>10</sup>

## **Pragmatic uncertainty of ESS**

The ESS undoubtedly being a big step forward still does not exactly define further directions of the ESDP evolution. The outlines of ESDP development planned by the ESS have too much pragmatic uncertainty. The ESS defines more or less only semantics (or ideology) of the ESDP.

Still, these elements of pragmatic uncertainty are the most interesting features of analyzed document from practical viewpoint. They define vital future contours of ESS application. *Uncertainty, openness to interpretation, to mutual misunderstanding, to cycles of enchantment and disenchantment, to differences between rhetoric and behavior would negatively impact Russian-European security relations.*

Let us enumerate the most important elements of Strategy's uncertainty from the perspective of Russian–EU cooperation:

1. The ESS is a compromise between liberal institutionalism, on the one hand, and neorealist, neoconservative approaches, on the other hand. The first presumes a big role for international institutes and organizations as a means to organize multilateral cooperation. The second emphasizes the role of enforcement in international politics. In this respect, the ESS text demonstrates a kind of a logical circle. It prefers cooperation to enforcement. However, the same enforcement is proposed for consolidating international institutes and organizations that will be a base for cooperation. Understanding of these institutes (as well as in the case of neoconservatism) is rooted in Western historical tradition and values. In these basic respects European multilateralism and American neoconservatism have more semantic than practical differences. At the same time, the document being of compromise nature does not satisfy both sides.

2. The ESS text is criticized by the proponents of more narrow or “hard” interpretation of security problems as well as by the advocates of more broad and disinterested European participation in solving international problems. The first think that European approach to security problems defines them so broadly that it makes them practically non-solvable. More narrow and more close to American approach definition of security would have the following advantages. It would give the possibility to accurately define the vital interests of Europe making the EU's involvement in international affairs

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<sup>10</sup>Op. cit., P. 15.

really necessary and giving the possibility to mobilize necessary resources. At the same time, it would permit to tackle a restricted circle of problems and, as a result, to use resources more efficiently.

The adherents of the second school of thought believe that the strategy, in fact, restricts the possibilities of European participation in solving many important global problems. This comes, for example, from the link between poverty and underdevelopment, on the one hand, and terrorism, on the other hand. This correlation can be understood in a sense that Europe is ready to fight poverty and underdevelopment only to the extent in which these phenomena cause terrorism. Thus poverty reduction becomes a hostage to terrorism fighting. In the final analysis, the ESS text does not define to which extent the EU is ready to give up other interests in order to maintain global stability. It simply avoids indicated dilemma by giving specific widened interpretation to the notions “interest” and “security”.

3. The same can be said about EU immediate neighborhood. The ESS document does not give clear understanding of the extent to which Europe is ready to give up other interests for the sake of creating the framework of stable cooperation with its neighbors.

4. The ESS text does not define a balance between different internal and external problems. Therefore it is unclear which resources the EU is ready to divert from solving internal problems and to shift to securing regional and global stability.

5. The document proclaims necessity to avoid appearance of “new division lines” in Europe. However, it is not clear, what kind of concessions Europe is ready to make to its partners. It is not known what kind of costs Europe is ready to bear in order to avoid emergence of these lines.

6. The ESS text does not specify extent to which European involvement in solving international problems will be linked with compulsory expansion of EU values and standards. Extent of taking into account objective ability of EU partners to adapt to these values and standards is a key issue for Russia. It is unknown whether Europe will follow declared values and standards in the cases when they contradict its own interests. And this kind of uncertainty means the possibility to apply “double standards”.

7. The ESS does not strictly define the ratio between pressure and compromise, constraint and dialogue. On the one hand, the ESS text makes cooperation a priority. On the other hand, it leaves open the possibility to manipulate the institutional framework of this cooperation. Besides the necessity to coerce those who breaches this framework is proclaimed. As a result, compulsive policy is simply transferred to higher level, where it is hidden under positive rhetoric.

### **ESS and Russian interests: four major conclusions**

1. The ESS is a step forward in formulating a unified security policy (security relations with Russia are a logical part of this unified policy).

2. The ESS contains very friendly rhetoric and formulates cooperative

policies towards Russia.

3. There are some theoretical and practical similarities between Russian approaches to world affairs and those of the ESS. However, these should not be exaggerated.

4. The ESS is too much open to interpretation. It still contains too much uncertainty. This uncertainty will negatively impact the Russian-EU relations.

# Common Europe narrows European security

*By Victor Kamyshanov*

Security is closely linked to political and institutional efficiency. This is widely acknowledged on different levels of the European Union. That is why political and institutional efficiency of the European Union shall be taken into consideration in the studies of European security. Following this approach the problem of the European security consists of several layers having both military-political and socio-economic character.

In the past security was measured by a level of military capabilities of two confronting superpowers – the USA and the USSR and their allies. In this sense European security was a substantial part of general concept of the western security provided by the NATO and the USA. Does this approach have any value under the present circumstances?

For the moment, it is widely considered that the level of military confrontation has decreased and new challenges have become the common threat to European security. “Political, social and technological developments have created a fluid security environment where risks and vulnerabilities are more diverse and less visible.”<sup>1</sup> These changes form a new concept of security on national, continental and global levels.

One of the basic elements of the modern concept of security in Europe is connected to the ongoing integration process in Europe. The main question in this context is whether enlargement of the European Union really ensures the progress in strengthening European security or it creates a mere illusion of it.

The processes within the EU should have diverse evaluation depending on whether these are relations within the “old” Europe<sup>2</sup>, between “old” and “new” Europe or within a “new” Europe. Besides, the European Union is not a closed system. The outside structures influence the course of integration. First of all, it concerns the system of relations between the USA and Europe; Russia and Europe. Such institutional structures as the NATO are also influencing this analysis. In this context one has to define whether there is a difference between the notions «European security» and «security within the European Union».

One important element in developing European security concept is the acknowledgement of the priorities of the UN Charter in solving security problems. But what seems missing is the priority of the UN decision-making in defining involvement in peacekeeping or conflict prevention operations. This is an important element of ensuring international security. Europe in

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<sup>1</sup> *Research for a Secure Europe. Report of the Group of Personalities in the field of Security Research.*  
<http://www.iss-eu.org/activ/content/gop.pdf>

<sup>2</sup> Here we do not use the term “Western Europe” as well as other geo-political definitions as they bear too political sense then it is necessary today for studying current situation in Europe.

order to maintain its security has to avoid dual standards and fragmentation of security building measures due to prevailing political, economic, corporative or other interests.

This many-sided situation determines the security policy of European Union and its influence on contemporary political and economic processes.

British prime-minister Tony Blair in his speech in Ghent (Belgium) in 2000 extolled the EU saying «the European Union has been one of the outstanding political achievements of the twentieth century. It has provided a framework for law and institutions which respects the rights of Europe's democracies, large and small: which allows competition but prevents dominance»<sup>3</sup>.

“Preventing dominance” is quite an important formula that should be used for elaborating security concept, since domination is the main source of destabilisation. Unfortunately the way of thinking of “old” Europe is characterized by implicit division of the continent into many fragments differentiated by its political, economic, and social position. “Old” Europe and “new” Europe have more and more difficulties in understanding each other. It creates obstacles to the integration processes and becomes more alarming when dealing with the security policy.

Contemporary period of the EU development substantially differs from the initial period of the EU formation in the 50-60's. During initial steps of the integration process, Western European economic structures were eager to promote economic development, to compete with the US. Formation of the Common Market and its consequent transformation to the EU was accompanied with the search for balance of economic and political interests in the name of this common goal.

The institutional structure of the European community was set up according to this pattern. However, a new political situation after the collapse of the USSR boosted political dimension of the EU, complicating at the same time economic processes within the EU and its relations with potential newcomers. It also stimulates the development of common security institutions. Javier Solana points out that “as a union of 25 states with over 450 million people producing a quarter of the world Gross National Product (GNP) the European Union is a global actor; it should be ready to share the responsibility for global security.”<sup>4</sup>

Do these developments meet real demands and hopes of Common Europe citizens? Several indicators are to be considered. Election process is one of the indicators of this. One can evaluate differently the results of recent European elections. However, we can see lowering support for the integrative processes in Europe and decreasing part of the population participates in the elections. The highest participation rates in 10 Central and East-European states are in Belgium (90, 8%) and the lowest in Poland (20%). A gap between «old Europe» (47, 7% of average participation) and «new Europe» (28, 7%) is huge.

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<sup>3</sup> “The Guardian”, February 23, 2000.

<sup>4</sup> A Secure Europe in a Better World, European Council, Thessaloniki 20/06/2003.

People's expectations are more pessimistic than a year ago. Despite many successes in realization of integration plans there are still different economic, military-political, and party-political groups that pursue sometimes incongruous interests.

**The most important issues our country is facing at the moment  
(EU15)<sup>5</sup>**

Unemployment	42%
Crime	28%
Economic situation	27%
Rising prices/inflation	19%
Health care system	16%
Immigration	14%
Terrorism	12%
Pensions	11%
Taxation	7%
The educational system	7%
Housing	4%
Defence/Foreign affairs	2%
Public transport	2%
Protection of the environment	2%
Don't know	1%
Other (spontaneous)	1%

The results of the poll above show quite passive attitude of the EU population to the defence policy and concept of security seems to be linked in the consciousness of population to private problems of people.

Another problem that is underestimated in political evaluation of the European security processes is the principle of national equality and ethno-national situation in the EU.

The most vivid example of this problem for the EU is its relations with Turkey. This country despite its long-lasting NATO membership continues to be pariah among patricians. The discussion of the readiness of Turkey to become an EU member-state reveals political limitations, but not economic ones. That contradicts to the principles of relations formulated by founders of the idea of Common Europe fixed in Article 2 of Consolidated version of the Treaty establishing the European community.

“The Community shall have as its task, by establishing a common market and an economic and monetary union and by implementing common

<sup>5</sup> Source: Survey no. 60.1 – Fieldwork Oct. – Nov. 2003 // Standard Eurobarometer 60 – Fig. 2.1a.

policies or activities referred to in Articles 3 and 4, to promote throughout the Community a harmonious, balanced and sustainable development of economic activities, a high level of employment and of social protection, equality between men and women, sustainable and non-inflationary growth, a high degree of competitiveness and convergence of economic performance, a high level of protection and improvement of the quality of the environment, the raising of the standard of living and quality of life, and economic and social cohesion and solidarity among Member States”<sup>6</sup>.

However, the position on Turkey’s membership is quite different. «On Turkey, the European Council indicated that if at its meeting in December 2004, it decided, on the basis of a Commission report and recommendation, that Turkey fulfilled the political criteria defined at Copenhagen in 1993 for the accession of the third countries to the EU, it would then open negotiations with that country without delay”<sup>7</sup>.

Thus the progress in this case mainly depends on ability of the constructors of the West European integration to overcome the confrontational national thinking and to adapt political and economic structures of “new” Europe to the common goals that are being implemented by European Union as integrative structure of the “old” Europe.

So Europe is suffering from the pressure of internal political contradictions that are sharpened by national processes and conflicts. To solve these problems the EU has initiated the substantial political discussion by organizing European Convention<sup>8</sup>. The necessity of this move is proved both by the content and tonality of contributions to the Convention.

The European Community admits that all its member-states are equal but it seems that there are some that are more equal. It is the biggest contradiction within unified Europe.

Formation of the European Union is a result of diminishing role of the national state in Western Europe at the last quarter of the 20th century. This partially reflects the turn to neo-liberal values in respect to relations between state and civil society. This turn by itself does not diminish the role of national level. The other aspect directly influences this level. It is the result of the shift to three alternatives to national systems – supranational, sub-national and transnational. This reflects the process of “old” Europe’s integration into global economy. A single market and, increasingly, a single economy in Europe has provided the basis for its prosperity.

“New” Europe considers its participation in the EU as a way to strengthen the role of a national state freed from the domination of the Soviet Union. Political elites of “new” Europe want to guarantee their national interests, but not the unity within Europe. One of the examples of this approach is a contribution of the Polish representative at the Convention. «I am convinced that the enlargement of the Union will have a positive effect on the economies and societies of these countries but they must be

<sup>6</sup> European Union, Official Journal C 325 of 24 December 2002.

<sup>7</sup> The *General Report on the Activities of the European Union* 2002. Published annually by the Commission as required by Article 212 of the EC Treaty, Article 17 of the ECSC Treaty (as regards activities conducted until 23 July 2002) and Article 125 of the EAEC Treaty.

<sup>8</sup> European Convention started its work on February 28, 2002.

convinced of this. This conviction will only come if the Union shows itself open to establishing a new quality of political and economic relationship with them. Of course, we will insist on political and economic conditions but let us go beyond the Partnership and Cooperation Agreements, let us talk free trade and cooperation to create a yet far larger area of internal security in Europe»<sup>9</sup>.

The well known position of the new EU member states in support of the US military operation in Iraq also reflects this position.

“Old” Europe also has not given up terminology linked to “national” interests. Mr. Blair looking back on position of British citizens argues for increasing role of Britain in the process of formation of Common Europe underlining the role of national interests and patriotism: «At this crucial juncture, where reforms of an absolutely momentous nature are being debated and decided, Britain’s place must be at the centre of them. To withdraw from them is not patriotic; it is an abdication of our true national interest. Other countries playing a leading role in Europe do not see the European Union as an alternative to the nation state; indeed, they see it as a way of enhancing their national interests. At a time when countries are coming together ASEAN in Asia, MERCOSUR in Latin America, and NAFTA in North America – Eurosceptic isolationism means marginalization.»<sup>10</sup>

This forceful attack against the opponents of Common Europe is clear. There are not so many changes in position of the British population on the EU. British public is quite sceptical about Euro. The poll of “The Sun” demonstrated that 81% of its participants have no idea about the work of the Convention and 84% are in favour of the referendum to be held on ratification of the treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe<sup>11</sup>.

Multiple provisos in the official documents of the EU where it is underlined that Member States have set up common institutions to which they delegate some of their sovereignty so that decisions on specific matters of joint interest can be made democratically at European level can be considered as a concession to the national priorities.

Introduction of Euro also revealed a lot of differences in the EU. Polls and referendums have demonstrated the existence of many opponents to this idea in France and many of the EU countries that were the first to join Euro zone. It allows to the Eurosceptics to consider that the European integration process is far from passing by its turning point.

The work of the Convention and discussions on national level also proved that internal tensions in “old” Europe are not decreasing. According to the evaluation of some experts now the danger of undermining of the communitarian decision-making method in the EU (which considered to be a source of success for the last 50 years) seems quite real. Thus as it is seen also by members of the European Parliament the hopes for democratization of the EU system may be buried and ancient authoritarian idea of the

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<sup>9</sup> Personal remarks by Prof. Danuta Hubner Representative of Poland’s Government to the Convention on the Future of the European Union Plenary Session, Brussels, July 12, 2002 // <http://european-convention.eu.int/docs/speeches/3916.pdf>.

<sup>10</sup> “The Guardian”, February 23, 2000.

<sup>11</sup> Adopted by consensus by the European Convention on 13 June and 10 July 2003.

Directoire<sup>12</sup> will emerge in a new institutional form<sup>13</sup>.

Although the leaders of the 15 EU countries repeatedly underlined that institutional reforms facilitated accession of the “newcomers”, many in Brussels considered it as slyness. The acting members of the EU boosted the crucial points of concordance in accordance with their own interests. So the “new” members had to join to already ready-made system.

Security problems of Europe are growing also due to globalization. In its present form the EU becomes more political than economic institution. At the same time it more corresponds to the demands of economic globalization than to the demands of political globalization. This is the reason for the difficulties that were articulated by Jacques Santer: “Situation with Iraq obviously demonstrates that our Union is not able to conduct common external policy. The EU has not drawn a conclusion out of its economic abilities and power.»

All this is complicated by a new approach of the USA to the world affairs. The new concept appeared after 11 September 2001. According to it, the USA has to have a right to enforce its will on the rest of the world. A lot of politicians do not share this approach and are alarmed by this. J. Santer points to the fact that “there is no single pole in the World whatever somebody wants. The world is multi-polar: there are the USA and Europe, Asia, China, India, there is Russia. It’s reality. The attempts to act unilaterally are unacceptable. We are partners. The partnership means, first of all, full mutual confidence.”<sup>14</sup>

The situation in Iraq proves that cautious approach of Europeans to the use of force against the countries defined by the USA government as «axis of evil» has its real ground. The USA are eager to attract Europe to solving emerging problems. Cooperation as it is seen by the USA means a shift from lengthy multisided consultations to the direct actions. The USA insists on more direct cooperation in the area of non-proliferation of the weapons of mass destruction. The Europeans are called to support priorities and methods of the present US strategy by limiting their own independence and identity.

This approach is shared by some politicians in Europe. «Germany, right here in Europe, must work toward protecting tight cohesion within the trans-Atlantic alliance.»<sup>15</sup>

Discussions on the construction of the European Union and its role in world politics in new political circumstances have shifted attention from the formation of the common responsibility for the security in Europe and in the World. The Balkan war has become a reflection of destruction of many basic principles of this.

The ongoing processes in Europe prove those security problems are

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<sup>12</sup> Intergovernmental agreement of several European great powers.

<sup>13</sup> O. Butorina. Institutional development and building political union// European Union: Facts and comments. Issues 32. March 2003 – May 2003. Association of European Studies, 2003 (in Russian).

<sup>14</sup> Ibid.

<sup>15</sup> April 8, 2002 International Herald Tribune // A New Vision For Germany.

not any more the core of the European integration. The main difficulty is slow development of common European foreign policy, and security policy as it is pointed by former prime minister of Sweden Carl Bildt<sup>16</sup>. This is explained by opposition to elaboration of such policy by some leading European countries and, first of all, by Britain that has specific relations with the USA not correlating with European position. The discussion at the European Convention once again highlighted these differences. It was pointed out that the UK has lots of concerns here, not least the role of a new double-hatted EU foreign minister, who will work for both the European Commission and the European Council. The UK does not want to call him or her a foreign minister, since it is worried at the commission's gaining new back-door powers over national foreign policy.

While this discussion is going on, Europe continues to be weakened in front of new challenges that are manifested in the increased threat of international terrorism, separatism, as well as ecological and energy security problems.

It confirms the existence of different evaluations and perceptions of development of the EU. Quite open remarks on the foreign policy integration processes in Europe were made in German newspaper "Die Zeit". Analyzing relations of the USA and Europe it wrote: "Some time ago seven prominent European intellectuals in different European newspapers published a call for the renewal of Europe. There was no one from the Eastern Europe. Some two years ago such a neglecting of Eastern Europeans would have provoked a squall of indignation. But it seems that after a war in Iraq new rules of political ethics were elaborated in Paris and Berlin. There is a feeling that in front of Derrida and Habermas<sup>17</sup> and other modern philosophers the Eastern Europeans have betrayed the idea of Europe and lost their right to think over the future of its culture by demonstration of angel obedience to Bush administration"<sup>18</sup>.

The serious dilemma that is faced by Eastern Europeans consists of the lack of confidence in the "old Europe» represented by Germany and France but, at the same time, they see their future only within the EU and the NATO. According to the German analysts this dilemma becomes even more evident as this position is supported by all layers of population and politicians eager not only to substantially modernize and regulate their own society but to protect a "new Europe» from instability.

Where does this instability come from? This is a basic question for European integration. Unfortunately there is only one-sided vision of Russia. It is considered only as a close unpredictable neighbour, as a source of natural recourses still needed for European economy and prosperity. This vision characterizes an approach of the "old Europe».

In this context it is worth to pay attention to the fact that in interpreting

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<sup>16</sup> Karl Bildt. Moral duty of "Antisovetchik" – to return Russia into Europe // Russia in global politics. Volume 1 № 2 – April – June, 2003 (in Russian).

<sup>17</sup> Jurgen Habermas. Why Europe needs a Constitution? New Left Review 11, September-October 2001.

<sup>18</sup> «Die Ziet», 17 august 2003.

European identity and “European values” Western European public figures and representatives of scientific and culture elite are still far away from accepting Russians as “Europeans”.

For “new” Europe Russia is only a “bear” whose image is used to resolve internal political problems. It sometimes happens even in “old” Europe. “Fear of Russia, and not values and convictions that are presented by Europe as if it is the only representative of Good in the world, pushes the eastern Europeans to the embraces of the EU and the NATO. Eastern European societies with hesitation accept the so-called “catalogue of values” brought before the candidates to the accession to the EU because they see in it only senseless obstacle on the way to prosperity”<sup>19</sup>.

While having quite intensive political and economic exchanges with the EU, Russia also observes the process of European integration from outside. Russia’s integration into the European Union seems unreal as Russia have to solve a lot of internal problems. The EU, in its turn, is not ready for this as the present stage of accession consumes in coming decade all economic resources of the EU. It seems that on both sides this is also supplemented with the lack of confidence that the project “Common Europe” as it is presented by policymakers will be a success.

Nevertheless, in official political documents for the near future the current rhetoric of “constructing common Europe without dividing lines” and “cooperation of the EU and Russia in the sphere of international relations” will be kept. The “Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation” between the EU and Russia is based on mutually shared principles from assistance to international peace and security up to support of democratic processes based on political and economic freedom.

This approach will assist certain progress in relations of Russia and the EU but the interests of Europe will be limited to its own stable development using Russia’s resources, first of all, energy. The EU being the major trade partner of Russia will be eager to maintain the present trade balance (34% of Russia’s export and 35% of its import). The energy amounts to more than half of this turnover. But one should not overestimate this – Russia’s share in EU overall trade is 3,2% (import) and 2,9% (export).

Looking positively at the process of cooperation between Russia and the EU it shall be realized, nevertheless, that the existing model of relations doesn’t facilitate the overcoming of differences in views on the European integration.

Reacting to problem of overcoming stereotypes in assessing European integration German SD politician Peter Clotz points out at “Deutsche Welle”: “We have to make such a model that facilitates the fruitful cooperation of the European Council, European Commission and European Parliament. We have to become closer to the people because they began to fear the unified Europe. Is really the experience of the creation of the EU in such a way so lame if it is necessary to make so many changes now?”<sup>20</sup>

Uncertainty that all the ideas of Common Europe will be accepted by the Europeans was confirmed at the Convention discussions: «Checks and

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<sup>19</sup> Ibid.

balances are a fundamental feature of our democracies. People have a sense that more and more of their daily lives are governed at the European level. They want many important things to remain the preserve of national and regional government. Whilst it is not the task of the Convention to comb through the *acquis communautaire* in the search for possible abuses, it is our job to make sure that we have system for the future in which we can all have confidence»<sup>21</sup>.

Traditional concept of security, as it is seen by political elites and military scientists, is connected mainly to the state relations. Meanwhile a real personal security as identified in the recent report of the Commission on human security<sup>22</sup> is driven by personal wishes – to get welfare and to be respected as human being in present and in the future. This putting of the human being to the center of security policy seems to be a simpler and clearer definition of this concept. It foresees the satisfaction of the basic demands of a human being and guarantees vital freedoms. But policymakers still didn't give up old concept of European security.

So the real formation of the space called “Common Europe”, which is continuing still to create more problems than their solutions, will depend on the way in which the relations between the common people in wider Europe will be organized, not burdened by ideological, economic and political tasks and stereotypes.

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<sup>20</sup> <http://academy-go.ru/Site/RussiaEC/Publications/EuroConvent.shtml>.

<sup>21</sup> Contribution from Mr. Peter Glotz, Mr. Peter Hein, Ms Danuta Hubner, Mr. Ray McSharry, Mr. Pierre Moscovici, members of the Convention: The European Convention The Secretariat Brussels, 14 June 2002 Conv 88/02 Contrib 46.

<sup>22</sup> The Commission on Human Security was established in January 2001 through the initiative of the Government of Japan and in response to the UN Secretary-General's call at the 2000 Millennium Summit for a world “free of want” and “free of fear.”

**Scientific Council for Coordination of International Research (SCCIR) of the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO)** was founded in May, 2004 with a view of development and deepening of analytical work of the University in the field of international relations, carrying out of examination of foreign policy initiatives and actions. The sphere of scientific interests of **SCCIR** includes studies of conceptual aspects of foreign policy of Russia, analysis of tendencies of evolution and development of international processes, of important and urgent international issues.

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## **Center for Euro-Atlantic Security of the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO-University)**

Center for Euro-Atlantic Security was established in 2004. It is a part of Scientific Council for Coordination of International Research of MGIMO. Its tasks include: conducting scientific work, preparing analytical papers and reports for the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Collective Security Treaty Organization structures (CSTO), Inter-Parliamentary Assembly of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). The Center organizes international conferences and seminars, publishes scientific books and articles.

The Center has established relations with analytical structures of the CIS countries as well as with some American, European and Asian scientific organizations.

Some of the projects of the Center are conducted in cooperation with the Center for Political and International Studies and Russian Political Science Association.

The Center specializes in the following issues:

- international security architecture,
- relations of Russia and the CSTO with NATO and the EU,
- peace-keeping operations and conflict resolution,
- nuclear policy, international talks and treaties on arms reductions,
- new threats and challenges to international security.

In 2004-2006 the Center has convened the following international seminars and conferences:

- Russia – EU: Prospects and principles of strategic interaction;
- Strategy of a dialogue between Russia, the CSTO and the EU in the sphere of security;
- Security and culture;
- New approaches to peace and stability in North-East Asia: problems of peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula;
- Problems of Russia-NATO interaction in peacekeeping.

The Center published some analytical reports including: “Problems of counteracting terrorism”, “The EU development assistance programmes”, “Riots in France: character, causes and lessons” as well as some articles in scientific journals “World Economy and International Relations”, “Polis”.

Director of the Center is Prof. Alexander I. Nikitin. Dr. Nikitin is a member of the UN expert Commission on Mercenaries under the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, a member of International Pugwash Council, Vice Chairman of the Russian Pugwash Committee of Scientists for Disarmament and International Security; Professor at the Moscow State Institute for International Relations; President of the Russian Political Science Association; member of CSTO Expert Council; member of Bureau of Presidium of International Federation for Peace and Conciliation. He is an author of more than 100 scientific publications on six languages.